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Abstract: 
Data from a recent Tanzanian household survey are used to investigate households’ connectedness 
to market economy i.e. commercialisation. The study puts emphasis on facilitating access to the 
nearest markets and market information as means to enhance commercialisation. 
Commercialisation and total consumption are found to be highly correlated and mutually 
reinforcing. The more commercialised the household is, the higher probability it has to be well off 
and thus enhanced commercialisation should be encouraged as a way to increase households’ 
welfare. The distance to the nearest market and the availability of market information are found to 
be significant factors in households’ degree of commercialisation. However, the importance of 
large regional fixed effects highlights the importance of the structural barriers for trade in 
Tanzania. 
 
 
 
Keywords:  
Commercialisation, poverty, transaction cost, household model, Tanzania. 
 
JEL classification: C31, I31, Q12 
 
                                                 
1 University of Sussex, currently visiting the University of Copenhagen. Address for correspondence: 
Elina.Eskola@econ.ku.dk, Studiestraede 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen, Denmark. 
2 I gratefully acknowledge the useful comments from Alan Winters, Andrew Newell and Barry Reilly in writing this 
paper.  
 1
1 Introduction 
The underlying assumption of economic theory states that trade increases people’s welfare by 
allowing them to specialise and capture the producer and consumer surplus. Nevertheless, large 
numbers of households in the developing world still live largely in subsistence farming and the 
puzzle of rational decision makers withdrawing from the markets has been part of the development 
debate for years (see e.g. McKay et al. 1997). This withdrawal, however, is rarely done by choice. 
People resort to subsistence farming when the market institution fails to function efficiently, which 
leads to suboptimal specialisation and lower levels of welfare as the gains from trade are foregone. 
The market institution fails to facilitate the trade when transaction costs due to market exchange 
create disutility greater than the utility gained through the market transaction so that no market 
transaction takes place. Rather than a complete failure of the market, a more general case is that 
market transactions are replaced by surrogate institutions, such as informal reciprocal crop sharing, 
or that markets in fact exist but only the most efficient households are able to use them. Poor 
infrastructure, inefficient marketing systems, lack of information and the risk involved in trading 
are factors that increase the cost of trade. The higher the transaction costs, the higher the benefits 
from trade must be before a household is willing to engage in trade.  
 
De Janvry et al. (1991) argue that substantial benefits would be gained if missing markets could be 
(re-)opened for trade by decreasing the costs of transaction. The recommendation for reducing the 
obstacles for private households to participate especially in food market e.g. via reduced trade 
restrictions and better roads is well pronounced also elsewhere in the literature (Fafchamps 1997). 
In recent years, the argument in favour of facilitating market access for the purpose of poverty 
alleviation has regained sense of urgency within the donor community as well as within the 
developing country governments. For example the Tanzanian government has set efficient 
agricultural marketing high on the agenda of improving welfare in the country (Tanzanian PRSP, 
Agricultural Marketing Policy), and a private sector development programme (BEST) has already 
been launched in order to achieve this goal.  
 
Even though the general trend in the development discourse is in favour of commercialisation, how 
well it works in different contexts depends on the characteristics of the households, potential of the 
local market as well as the legal and political framework in which the commercialisation is to take 
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place. Furthermore, the success of further commercialisation in relieving poverty depends on how 
well the households are currently integrated in the market and to what extent the opportunities 
provided by specialisation have already been exploited. This study aims at providing evidence of 
the magnitude and nature of the welfare impact of commercialisation in Tanzania. Special attention 
is paid to the role of market access and market information as a constraint to commercialisation, and 
their role and potential in poverty alleviation. The purpose of the chapter is to analyse the current 
situation in the country and to establish and measure the links between commercialisation and 
consumption at the household level. The central hypothesis of this study is that access to markets 
and market information is a significant factor in a household’s decision on the degree to which the 
household participates in trade. Increased participation in trade at the local market is likely to 
increase consumer/producer surplus for the participating household and thus increase the 
household’s welfare. Hence, better market access is likely to increase the consumption level of the 
household thorough increased levels of trade. The study is aiming to answer two central research 
questions: 
 
• How does commercialisation affect households’ wellbeing? 
and 
• What are the determinants of commercialisation of the household economy in Tanzania?  
 
The remaining chapter is organised as follows: part two reviews the theoretical debate on 
commercialisation and its links to poverty, as well as the welfare impact of better market access; 
part three presents the theoretical model employed, and the empirical approach; part four introduces 
the data used for the empirical analysis, as well as discusses the construction of the main variables;  
part five explains the econometric methodology; part six presents and discusses the empirical 
results; and finally part seven concludes. 
 
2 Conceptual Framework of Commercialisation 
The term most often used on gains from prior subsistence farms engaging into trade is 
‘commercialisation’ that implies increased market transactions for capturing the gains from 
specialisation (von Braun 1995). By definition, commercialisation can occur both on the output side 
of production with increased marketed surplus or on the input side with increased use of purchased 
inputs, and most often these commercialisation effects occur simultaneously. Not only producers 
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but also consumers benefit from trading through consumer surplus and further ability to specialise 
in their own production. The term commercialisation can also be used to refer to market integration 
of household economy so that larger part of consumption is acquired through market transactions, 
which usually leads to further specialisation in the use of household’s productive resources (Von 
Braun & Kennedy 1994, 11-12). A broad definition of commercialisation referring to market 
integration by engaging in trade is adopted in this study.  
2.1 Commercialisation and Poverty 
The links between trade and poverty have been widely explored in the literature. A substantial 
contribution to the debate has been the survey edited by von Braun and Kennedy (1994) that 
summarises the results from several studies about commercialisation in 11 different sites in the 
developing world. In addition to reviewing case studies the authors lay out a framework for the 
possible ways in which commercialisation and welfare, in particular income and nutrition, are 
linked and could be analysed (figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1: Commercialization at the household level: determinants and consequences for income and 
nutrition. Source: von Braun and Kennedy (1994) p. 13.  
 
 4
Among the most important exogenous determinants of commercialisation are population change, 
availability of new technologies, infrastructure and market creation, and macroeconomic and trade 
policy. Some of these factors have more immediate effect on the farmer’s decision while others 
have more long-term effects. At the household level, the key factors in the commercialisation 
process are the availability of improved seeds and agricultural practices as well as investment in 
infrastructure and policies for market creation. All of the determinants of commercialisation are 
intertwined and mutually reinforcing, and thus improved trade policies, technical change, and better 
infrastructure are often inseparable tools and/or consequences of a commercialisation intervention. 
How the possible increased welfare of the household finally translates into increased welfare of the 
individuals depends on the decision making process within the household (endogenous 
consequences of commercialisation).  
 
Making generalising conclusions about the welfare impact of a commercialization programme is 
difficult. However, von Braun and Kennedy argue that in general overcoming the market failure 
that leads to subsistence farming is likely to cause beneficial outcomes through several links. The 
reduction of transaction cost creates a stronger price incentive for a producer to engage in trade. 
Improved markets and transportation networks increase the number of suppliers, which is also 
likely to lead to more reliable supply of food crops and less volatile prices at the markets. This, on 
the other hand, would lower the risk involved in trade and allow otherwise risk-avert and vulnerable 
households to specialise and benefit from selling cash crops as well as consuming larger variety of 
goods acquired from the market. It is important to bear in mind, however, that commercialization 
does not only relate to selling cash crops but commercialisation of food crops is an ever more 
important part of enhanced livelihoods in poor countries (see e.g. Heltberg & Tarp 2002). 
Furthermore, cash cropping does not need to be competitive with other agricultural activities but 
food cropping and cash cropping often grow and decline together (Maxwell 2001). Usually 
production for the market is only done when the household basic demand for food has been 
ensured. Poor households are willing to deviate from specialising in profit maximising resource 
allocation to maintain household food security based on own production of food crops when 
insurance markets are absent or unable to cover negative shocks from own crop failure or smooth 
consumption during a negative price shock at the market (von Braun & Kennedy 1994, 52). 
However, investment in improved technology can help subsistence farmers commercialize in low-
risk ways. In order to facilitate their use and to allow for full benefits from commercialization, the 
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development of the financial and insurance markets is a crucial complement to the 
commercialization efforts. The smallest households who currently participate less than 
proportionally in the market are likely to benefit most from targeted commercialization efforts (von 
Braun & Kennedy 1994, 370).  
 
Commercialisation of agriculture especially combined with expanded processing and trading 
activities has been observed to lead to a substantial expansion of demand for hired labour, which 
contributes to the income earning possibilities of poor households. To the extent that hired labour 
households rank among the malnourished poor, this employment effect may well be of particular 
benefit as demonstrated in case studies from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Guatemala, and Papua New 
Guinea (von Braun and Kennedy 1994, chapters 8, 11, 12 and 14). However, in case the new 
technology introduced to cultivate cash drops for the market is less labour intensive than the 
previous method and processing of the produce is not done in the village the effect on the demand 
for labour might also be negative. Still, selling new products and increased production for the 
market is likely to increase the household’s gross incomes. However, the increase in the net income 
is likely to be less because of large substitution effects within agricultural production and between 
agriculture and off-farm employment. Often labour intensive cash crop production draws labour 
back into agriculture, and slows down the urbanization. Increased income leads most often to 
increased spending on food and other necessities by the poor. How the increased consumption and 
control over increased resources is distributed within the household is part of the intra-household 
decision-making process.   
 
Contradictory to the framework outlined by von Braun and Kennedy (1994), concern has been 
raised about the possible damaging effects of commercialisation. It has been argued that even 
though commercialisation could be beneficial for the economy as a whole, its impact on the poor 
households would be mainly negative (see e.g. Lambert 1982 contradicted by Heywood & Hide 
1994). The empirical literature has produced both negative and positive conclusions even on the 
same commercialisation programmes and the evidence put forward has been at best inconclusive. 
Von Braun and Kennedy (1986) reviewed some of the available case studies and concluded that 
many of the studies showing negative effects on farming households have been conceptually flawed 
and based on false assumptions made in the studies. Despite the possible shortcomings of individual 
studies, the worry for the possible adverse effect on poor farmers has been influential in policy 
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design and a matter of debate even though empirical studies at large have failed to confirm this 
negative link. Longhurst (1988) reviewed empirical evidence and concluded that the results show 
no clear outcome either against or for commercialisation, but that the welfare effect of 
commercialisation depends on the way in which the programme is designed to suit the given 
context. He argues that promotion of non-food crops with long maturation periods and lumpy 
income flows from a narrow and unstable market might lead to adverse effects on households’ 
welfare whereas enhancing the commercialised production and selling of food crops that are 
complementary to the existing farming system and that give steady flows of income from well 
established local markets is likely to increase the consumption and welfare of the households.  
 
Even though judging all non-food products as bad commercialisation means over-simplifying the 
reality and might lead to abandoning otherwise viable policy options, Longhurst’s characterisation 
raises an important point of poverty impacts into the commercialisation debate: the way in which 
commercialisation is implemented is likely to change the multifaceted welfare outcomes of further 
market integration, and a smooth transition from subsistence farming into market economy cannot 
be assumed. Significant equity and environmental consequences may be caused by the change in 
production and consumption patterns unless appropriate policies are in place to facilitate the 
transition (Pingali & Rosengrant 1995). Markets work always in interaction with other institutions 
and policies and governments and policy-makers have an important role to play in ensuring long 
run efficient use of resources without adversely affecting the poor in the short run.   
2.2 Welfare Analysis on Facilitating Market Access 
The current study places emphasis on investigating the role of market access and information in 
commercialisation and poverty alleviation. Rural households, especially the poor, often say that one 
reason they cannot improve their living standards is that they face difficulties with market access 
due to distance to markets and lack of roads (IFAD 2001, p.161). The literature supports the 
hypothesis that inadequate market access in absence of roads, telephones and other infrastructure 
decreases welfare and hinders trade (Bougheas et al. 1999). Several empirical studies have 
concluded that sufficient provision of infrastructure services is an important component for poverty 
alleviation as such (e.g. van de Walle 2002a) and a necessary prerequisite for efficient trading (e.g. 
Ndumbaro 1995, Larson & Deininger 2001). Consequently many infrastructure projects have been 
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justified by referring them to be working for poverty reduction directly and indirectly through local 
trade creation.  
 
The link from infrastructure to improved standard of living works through several channels. 
Development of transport and communication infrastructure enhances people’s mobility, and 
increases interaction and informal learning. The change is reflected in increased use of imported 
goods, rising income, and entrepreneurial development that increases the capacity to perceive and 
the ability to seize comparative advantages. Rural credit markets often offer credit in kind but 
infrastructural development can reduce the extent of in-kind credits by transforming them into 
monetary exchange at lower transaction costs, which facilitates credit market expansion. Also 
labour markets are affected due to improved mobility of labour and the market becomes less 
fragmented providing more opportunities for the household members. New opportunities become 
available also for traditional farmers as new ideas spread through increased interaction, marketing 
of new inputs becomes logistically cheaper, and both factor and product markets operate more 
efficiently in infrastructurally developed areas facilitating the adoption of more efficient production. 
More concretely infrastructural development leads to reduction of marketing costs, expands 
markets, and improves market operation. Improved transportation infrastructure allows production 
of perishable and transport-intensive products to expand. Better access also converts latent demand 
into effective commercial demand and further expands the markets. Often this leads to further 
specialisation and possibilities to exploit economies of scale. (Ahmed 1994)  
 
The theory clearly predicts that infrastructure plays a critical role in commercialisation and welfare. 
The methods for actually verifying and quantifying the improvements are still developing to better 
capture the short and long term direct and indirect welfare affects of road building (Ravallion 2001, 
Gootaert 2002, van de Walle 2002a). Gibson and Rozelle (2002) investigated how effective access 
to infrastructure is in reducing poverty in the context of Papua New Guinea. The paper argues that 
as the rural poor have least access to infrastructure, they would be in the best position to gain from 
additional investment. Van de Walle (2002b) presents further evidence from Vietnam and argues 
that the benefits of roads are indirect and dependent on interactions with other investments, existing 
social and physical infrastructure, geography, community and household characteristics. Often road 
networks also have economy-wide effects: van de Walle found significant welfare effects of road 
construction at both household and commune level and was able to conclude that the strongest 
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impacts were among the poorest households. However, as infrastructure is an expensive 
development policy to pursue, more empirical evidence is needed to ensure that the impact of 
investment is not only positive but also superior to alternative uses of the resources. Fan et al. 
(2003) summarise the results from several individual studies conducted at the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) comparing different types of public investments to each other. 
They conclude that R&D, education, and infrastructure proved to be the most effective public 
spending in relation to poverty reduction. Also Datt and Joliffe (1999) produce empirical evidence 
of different welfare projects by analysing the effect of different determinants of poverty as well as 
their interaction with each other in Egypt. The authors argue that education and infrastructure are 
important complements and thus the benefits received from one depend on the level of achievement 
in the other.  
 
Also evidence from Tanzania argues in favour of facilitating market access in order to increase 
welfare. Lucas et al. (1995) evaluated a regional road project between Njombe and Makete in 
Tanzania that included improvements of feeder roads, bridge construction and road maintenance. 
The impact study found a 70% increase in daily traffic and a heavy decrease in fare prices. They 
also observed increased participation in the markets and expansion in the geographical size of the 
market. Furthermore, attendance at health care facilities and political meetings increased with the 
easier access. Airey et al. (1989) on the other hand, evaluated the Songea-Makambo road in 
Tanzania. Also here the use of the road doubled or trebled and the cost of vehicle transportation 
halved after the construction of the road. Even though the school enrolment did not increase, it 
became easier to recruit teachers to schools, and also access to health care facilities improved 
significantly. Ndumbaro (1995) takes the analysis further down to the grass root level of the 
transportation problems in rural areas in Tanzania. The article was based on rapid rural appraisal 
(RRA) surveys in Songea Rural District. The author discussed particular problems that the farmers 
faced that are linked to transportation infrastructure but not directly solved by improved 
infrastructure. For example the farmers had problems with hiring trucks even when the road was 
built as the transportation markets were not yet liberalised at the time when the study was carried 
out. Ndumbaro also identified new possibilities related to but not directly caused by better roads, 
such as that access to markets not only boosted agricultural activities but also increased other 
products to be made and sold at the markets leading to diversification and decrease in the 
vulnerability of the farmers.  
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It is important to bear in mind that the benefits from improved infrastructure are conditional on 
appropriate policies being in place allowing and encouraging trade to develop. As Fafchamps et al. 
(2003) point out, the price transmission, i.e. how prices at the central markets are linked to the 
prices at more remote markets, is not only dependent on transport costs but also frictions in the 
marketing chain. Besides strict exchange rate policy at macro level and limited access to credit at 
micro level, natural barriers caused by the remote location of the producers, unreliability of the  
transportation services, and corruption are often important barriers for local trade. Even though the 
reasons for low market participation of small holders vary, the recommendation for reducing the 
obstacles for private households to participate, especially in food markets, remain unchanged in the 
literature. “Food market integration via reduced trade restrictions, better roads and transportation, 
and/or government food shops can be a powerful tool to boost cash crop production and to increase 
responsiveness of small farmers to price incentives” (Fafchamps 1997).  
 
3 The model of Trade and Income 
As discussed above, the literature calls for active measures of supporting commercialization of 
subsistence farming as the markets alone in remote areas cannot be expected to lead to the optimum 
level of exchange, specialisation and allocation of resources. Here a model is constructed to 
theoretically establish the link from transaction costs to poor market integration. The model is then 
empirically tested in order to quantify the impact of commercialisation on consumption, as well as 
to identify ways to enhance commercialisation by lowering the cost of engaging in trade.  
 
The main emphasis of the more recent trend in the literature has been so-called non-separable 
household models where production and consumption decisions cannot be separated from each 
other but the household optimal production decisions depend on consumption. The most commonly 
cited sources of non-separability are transaction costs, thin markets, and risk aversion. One of the 
grounding studies on transaction costs in relation to household models was the model built by de 
Janvry et al. (1991) who discuss the phenomenon of missing markets. They argue that the definition 
of a market failure is household rather than commodity specific: in case the household is close 
enough to the market, have sufficient profit margin for its products, and in general is able to cover 
the transaction costs by the benefits from trading, it is likely to be better off when engaging in trade 
than otherwise. However, households in remote locations whose cost to access the market is high 
are often unable to cover the transaction costs to participate in trade even though in absence of the 
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cost of trade engaging in the market would be beneficial. This leads to non-existing or thin markets. 
The higher the transaction costs, the higher the benefits from trade must be before a household is 
willing to engage in trade. Another example of a transaction cost based models is the framework 
presented by Key et al. (2000). They argue that farmers face both fixed transaction costs that are 
invariant to the quantity of goods traded, and proportional transaction costs that lower the price 
effectively received by sellers. Thus the decision to engage in trading is done in two parts: first the 
household decides whether or not to participate considering the fixed transaction costs, and second 
if they decide to participate, how much would they sell. The framework of fixed and proportional 
transaction costs has been tested by Heltberg and Tarp (2002) who conclude that even though 
decreasing both proportional and fixed transaction costs are both important factors of the 
households’ decision, facilitating the market access of the currently isolated households is likely to 
be a pro-poor policy. 
 
The model concentrating on the existence of transaction costs as referred to in this study is 
formulated by Omamo (1998a, 1998b). He focuses on the proportional transaction costs but widens 
the argument from producers to cover also the net buyers. He argues that transaction costs form a 
wedge between buying and selling price, i.e. they raise the price for the buyer and decrease the price 
for the seller. Omamo (1998a) investigates links between transport costs and production patterns by 
adjusting the agricultural household model to incorporate costly trade. He uses the model to explain 
the production patterns in Kenya, that have previously been considered irrational, and argues that 
producing low-yielding food crops over high-yielding cash crops can be seen as optimal food 
import substitution in presence of high transportation costs. In his other paper (1998b) Omamo 
elaborates the discussion, and argues that choosing low-yielding food crops can be explained even 
in absence of risk or lack of technical feasibility of the high-yielding marketed varieties if the new 
technologies involve greater specialisation that expands income but raises transaction costs by 
more. He tests the model with a simplified numerical model and simulates household optimal 
behaviour as the distance to the market (used as a proxy for transportation costs) increases and finds 
that even reasonably short distances make a difference in the optimal strategy. Omamo concludes 
that in his case study “for a household residing more than four kilometres from a market centre, 
expenditure savings from diversification outweight income losses” (Omamo 1998b). 
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3.2 The Current Model 
The model applied in this study is based on the basic model outlined by Singh et al. (1986) and 
Bardhan & Udry (1999). It has been modified along the lines of Omamo (1998a, 1998b) to 
incorporate an explicit analysis of transportation margins into the welfare analysis, making the 
model non-separable. The household is assumed to maximise its utility function: 
 
( )lCCuU NFF ,,=      (1) 
where  
CF is consumption of food which can be produced at home or bought from the market,  
CNF is consumption of non-food items that cannot be produced at home but have to be bought from 
the market (say soap, kettle, shoes), and  
l is leisure. 
 
The utility function is assumed to be well behaved: quasi-concave with positive partial derivatives. 
It is maximised subject to constraints, namely time constraint (2), production constraint (3), and 
income constraint (4). The total time available to the household must be equal to the time it spends 
on work and the time allocated for leisure: 
 
lHT +=        (2) 
where  
T is the total time endowment and  
H is time spent on work.  
 
The production constraint, on the other hand, depicts the relation between inputs and outputs: 
 
( )ALfQ ,=       (3) 
where  
Q is the total output of food that the household produces,  
L is the total amount of labour (either family labour input or rented labour) used in production, and 
A is the fixed endowment of other factors of production, such as land.  
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Furthermore, the income constraint is specified as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1F F NF NFP Q C W H L P Cλ λ λ+ − ⋅ − + − = +    (4) 
 
where 
PF is the price of the food at the market, 
PNF  is the price of the non-food item at the market, 
λ1 and λ2 are the transaction costs of trading, such as going to the market, acquiring market 
information, and negotiating prices. For the simplicity of the model, this cost is assumed to be the 
same for all goods. The transaction cost 1λ  is added to the market price the household has to pay if 
the household is buying a good, and transaction cost 2λ  is deducted from the price that the 
household receives if the household is a net seller of food. For each household only one of the λ :s 
is relevant in terms of food depending on whether the household is a net buyer or a net seller. 
Unlike generally assumed in the household models, the cost of transaction does not have to be the 
same for the buyers and the sellers, but the incidence of the cost depends on the supply and demand 
elasticities. The status of the household is determined by the second term where the food 
consumption is deducted from the household’s total food production. Finally, 
W is the wage rate determining the value of the marketed labour. The wage is assumed to be a going 
market wage rate for which the household can either buy or sell labour. The whole term is negative 
if household uses more labour in its production that it gives, i.e. the household is net buyer of 
labour, and positive if household’s own labour is higher than its labour use for production. If the 
household is neither buying nor selling labour the term for the marketed labour is zero. As the 
emphasis of the model is on trading goods, the possible transaction cost related to the labour market 
is ignored in the model. 
 
All prices in the model, i.e. PF, PNF, and W are assumed to be exogenous and thus the household is a 
price taker. The constraints discussed above can also be combined into one budget constraint as 
follows: 
 
Marketed 
surplus 
Marketed 
labour 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1,F F F NF NFP f L A W L W T P C P C W lλ λ λ λ λ+ − − ⋅ + ⋅ = + − ⋅ + + + ⋅  (5) 
 
 
The Lagrangian function for constrained optimisation then becomes:  
 
( , , )F NFL u C C l= +      (6) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1,F F F NF NFP f L A W L W T P C P C W lµ λ λ λ λ λ+ − − ⋅ + ⋅ − + − ⋅ − + − ⋅⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
      
The first order conditions for a net seller are:  
( )2F
F
U P
C
µ λ∂ = −∂  
( )1NF
NF
U P
C
µ λ∂ = +∂      (7) 
U W
l
µ∂ =∂  
( )2F QP WLλ
∂− =∂  
 
and for a net buyer:  
( )1F
F
U P
C
µ λ∂ = +∂  
( )1NF
NF
U P
C
µ λ∂ = +∂      (8) 
U W
l
µ∂ =∂  
( )1F QP WLλ
∂+ =∂  
 
Farm profit (Π) Value 
of time 
Value of total expenditure 
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Some comparative statistics reveal how increase in the trading costs will change the household’s 
behaviour. At optimum ( )1 2, , , , , *F F F NFC C P P W Yλ λ=  and ( )1 2, , , , , *NF NF F NFC C P P W Yλ λ=  
where the income Y* is defined as in the budget constraint: 
 
( )1 2* * * * * *FY P Q W L W T W Tλ λ π= + − − ⋅ + ⋅ = + ⋅    (9) 
 
For the net seller of food crops, when trading costs go up, the household is likely to consume more 
of the food it produces at home and production is likely to decrease, i.e. the household will 
withdraw from the market. In order to see this more formally, differentiating FC  with respect to the 
trading cost 2λ  using the Slutsky equation will lead to: 
 
( )* 0 0
2 2 2 2
* 0
* *
F F F F F
U F
C C C C CY Q C
Y Yπλ λ λ λ∆ = ∆ =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂= + ⋅ = + − ⋅ >∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   (10) 
 
 
To investigate household’s integration to the market, a new variable for marketed surplus is defined 
as  
 
FM Q C= −       (11) 
 
where M is the total marketed surplus. Differentiating: 
 
( )0
2 2 2
0
*
F F
U F
C CM Q Q C
Yλ λ λ ∆ =
∂ ∂∂ ∂= − − − ⋅ <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    (12) 
 
 
The marketed surplus of a net seller decreases when the trading costs increase. Not only does the 
household sell less to the market but it also buys less as shown below. Another measure for market 
integration is consumption bought from the market (B). For a net seller B is defined as  
 
NFB C=        (13) 
< 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
Profit effect > 0 > 0 > 0
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and the impact of increased trading costs is given as  
 
1 1
0NFCBλ λ
∂∂ = <∂ ∂      (14) 
 
For the net buyer, on the other hand, the income can be re-written in terms of consumption:  
 
( ) ( )1 2 1* * * *F F NF NFY P C P C W lλ λ λ= + − ⋅ + + + ⋅    (15) 
 
Increased trading costs imply that the bought food is now more expensive, which encourages the 
household to buy less from the market and to produce more at home. To see this more formally, 
differentiating FC  with respect to the trading cost 1λ  yields 
 
( )* 0 0
1 1 1 1
* 0
* *
F F F F F
Y U F
C C C C CY C Q
Y Yλ λ λ λ∆ = ∆ =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂= − ⋅ = − − ⋅ <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   (16) 
 
 
For a net buyer of food, marketed surplus is negative. A more relevant measure of the net buyer’s 
integration to the market is the net consumption bought from the market (B) here defined as: 
 
( )NF FB C C Q= + −      (17) 
 
where B is the amount of goods bought from the market as defined above. Again, differentiating 
with respect to the trading costs we get:  
 
( )0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
*
NF NFF F F
U F
C CC C CB Q QQ C
Yλ λ λ λ λ λ λ∆ =
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂= + − = + + − ⋅ − <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  (18) 
 
 
 
The net buyer household will withdraw from the market by buying less of both food and non-food 
products and increasing its domestic production and thus withdrawing its labour from wage labour. 
< 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 > 0
Income effect < 0 > 0 > 0
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In sum, the optimal response to high trading costs if a household is a net buyer is greater home 
production and decreased consumption of marketed goods, and conversely high trading costs for the 
net seller imply reduced selling of the good and more consumption at home. Both sellers and buyers 
are pushed closer to autarky as transaction costs increase. This highlights the importance of 
marketing margins on market integration.  
3.3 Empirical Application 
The theoretical framework discussed in the literature review implies that the households would be 
better off if they were able to exploit trading opportunities and specialise on what they have 
comparative advantage of doing. If a household is efficient in farming, it is likely to produce a 
surplus which it can then sell to increase its consumption of non-food items and leisure. Easiness of 
trading allows also specialisation within the agricultural sector and thus even the net sellers may 
end up buying a variety of food items they consume from the market in exchange for their own 
produce as opposed to producing everything at home. On the other hand, other households may 
choose to specialise in selling labour and acquiring all food and non-food items from the market. 
This specialisation would lead to higher welfare levels for both net seller and net buyer households 
than what can be achieved in autarky. However, the model presented above highlights that 
transaction costs may hinder the process of specialisation and decrease the benefits of trading and 
thus lower the welfare of the households. The empirical section of the study aims at measuring the 
welfare impact gained from trade and specialisation, and identifying the sources of transaction costs 
and disconnectedness.  
 
As defined above, households’ income can be measured in terms of its total consumption. The value 
of consumption depends on the quantity of goods consumed (including leisure) and their prices. In 
the model transaction costs affected the value of consumption directly as part of the price in which 
the consumption was measured, as well as indirectly by affecting the optimal quantity of each good 
consumed. However, using household specific prices, i.e. consumer prices net of transaction costs, 
to measure the value of consumption will lead to different measurement for two households 
consuming identical quantities of all goods if one of the households is a net seller and the other a 
net buyer. In the empirical analysis the interest is on real consumption across all households and the 
market prices are used to aggregate the value of consumption of different goods in the consumption 
basket. In this case the total consumption is a direct function of real quantities consumed and their 
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market prices, and an indirect function of transaction costs though chosen level of 
commercialisation, i.e. the choice of optimal resource allocation into agricultural production, wage 
employment, and allocation of income into different marketed and home produced goods. The 
household consumption is defined as 
 
( ),Mh h i ih hY Y P C γ= ⋅    h = 1,…,H; i = 1,…, I (19) 
 
where hY is the total income of household h, 
M
iP is the price of the good i at the market, ihC is the 
quantity of good i consumed by household h, and hγ is a measure of commercialisation in household 
h. As discussed above, commercialisation is a summary term of a livelihood strategy choice 
including labour allocation into home production, buying and selling. As an indicator of households 
connectedness to the market, consumption bought from the market (B) was analysed for both sellers 
and buyers in the model above. This measure is used in the literature as an indicator of 
commercialisation. Von Braun and Kennedy (1994, 11-12) suggest using the ratio of bought goods 
and services over the total income instead of using absolute values in order to make the measure of 
commercialisation independent of household’s initial income. This ratio is also chosen as a proxy 
for commercialisation in the empirical application.  
 
M
h
h
h
B
Y
γ ≡       (20) 
 
where MB is the value of goods bought from the market measured at market prices. As the theory 
suggests and the model confirmed, commercialisation depends on transaction costs and income, i.e. 
 
( ),h h h hYγ γ λ=      (21) 
 
where hλ is the transaction cost that household h faces.  
 
The empirical model aims to find the determinants of household income and determine the 
importance of market integration in households’ welfare. Once the impact of commercialisation on 
consumption has been measured, exogenous determinants of commercialisation are investigated in 
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the empirical estimation in order to identify plausible policy instruments for welfare improvement. 
More detailed description of the estimation methodology and functional forms is presented in 
section 5. 
 
4 Data 
The key dataset used for estimating the empirical model is the Tanzanian Household Budget Survey 
(HBS) produced by the Tanzanian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (NBS 2002a). The 
Tanzanian HBS 2000/01 collected information from 22,178 households representing the total 
population of over 35 million. The HBS collected information on a range of individual and 
household characteristics including household members’ education, economic activities and health; 
household expenditure, consumption and income; ownership of consumer goods and assets; 
housing structure and materials; and household access to services and facilities. The information 
was collected using a household questionnaire and daily recordings of household consumption, 
expenditure and income over a calendar month. (NBS 2002b) 
 
Some statistical characteristics are worth highlighting in order to get a better understanding of the 
underlying structure of the data. Despite the fact that almost 80% of the population in Tanzania live 
in rural areas, urban areas are disproportionally represented in the unweighted data forming 65% of 
the household sample. Given this bias towards easily accessible mostly urban households, also for 
example the distance to the nearest, but not necessarily most important, markets measure is low for 
the interviewed households averaging at three kilometres for a one way journey in rural areas and 
under one kilometre for urban areas. Otherwise, the descriptive characteristics are mostly in 
accordance to prior hypothesis: the income is lower in the rural areas than in urban areas whereas 
family size is larger in rural areas compared to the cities. Urban dwellers are also more likely to 
acquire higher education lever as their rural counterparts. On the whole, the urbanisation has not 
largely developed in Tanzania and even the urban households report to large extent being farmers: 
60% of the rural household heads and 37% of the urban household heads have farming as their main 
activity in the unweighted sample. However, despite cultivating their own farms urban dwellers are 
more integrated to the markets and report on average 25 percentage points higher levels for 
commercialisation than rural households, who still rely on own production for a large part of their 
consumption. This is not to say that the rural households would not be commercialised as they 
acquire on average 62% of their consumption from the market. Again, these figures are describing 
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the unweighted sample which even in rural areas is biased towards more central areas. Wage 
employment is the dominant source of cash in urban areas whereas agriculture holds the dominant 
position in the rural areas as the main source of cash. Finally, the sample size is worth highlighting 
as the survey covered over 20000 households. Such a large dataset is likely to smooth any possible 
remaining sampling and data errors, and increases the credibility of the obtained results. 
 
5 Methodology 
5.1 Consumption 
OLS 
Estimating total consumption expenditure as presented in equation 19 is done by ordinary least 
squares (OLS). The OLS equation can be written as,  
 
ln h h hY X β ε= +      (22) 
 
where lnYh is the log of total consumption expenditure in household h; Xh is a vector of household 
characteristics such as degree of commercialisation, age and education of the household head, 
household size, main assets (land, cows, sheep) and economic activities; β is the coefficient vector 
defined as  
 
( ) YXXX ′′= − 1βˆ      (23) 
 
and hε  is a random error term. The data used for this study was collected in to stages: first sampling 
primary sampling units (most often villages) and then selecting households from each sampling 
unit. This implies that the standard errors of the estimation need to be adjusted to take into account 
that observations within each cluster may not be independent, but that households can be divided 
into M groups G1, G2, …, GM that are independent. The robust Huber/White/Sandwich estimator1 is 
used to obtain robust standard errors in this study as follows:  
 
                                                 
1 This estimator was first developed by Huber (1967) and White (1980) who developed the theorem independently of 
each other. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) 11 '''ˆ −− Ω= XXXXXXV β     (24) 
 
where the Ω is estimated as  
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⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
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⎡
=Ω
−
2
2
1
2
2
2
1
^
...
GM
GM
G
G
σ
σ
σ
σ
    (25) 
 
Here the values on the diagonal are the variances within each cluster and the values outside the 
diagonal (covariances between the villages) are all zeros. 
 
Besides clustered sampling, also sample weights were used in the survey to make the results 
nationally representative. However, including the sampling weights into the actual regression 
calculation is a matter of debate (see e.g. Deaton 1997, 67-73) and at present no consensus on the 
matter has been reached. I have chosen not to include the weights into the regressions as is a 
common practice in many applied econometric studies (see e.g. Heltberg & Tarp 2002).  
 
Endogeneity and Instrumental Variables 
As discussed above, there is a case to argue that commercialisation is in fact an endogenous 
explanatory variable in the consumption equation as wealthier people are more likely to buy from 
the markets merely because they can afford to do so. If this is true, then estimates using the OLS 
procedure may be biased. A way to alleviate the problem would be using instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation. As using the IV technique takes place at the cost of efficiency, the need for IV 
estimation is tested by using the so called Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test suggested by Davidson 
and MacKinnon (1993). The test was first proposed by Durbin (1954) and separately by Wu (1973) 
and Hausman (1978). Here the null hypothesis is that OLS is unbiased, i.e. any endogeneity among 
the regressors would not have a deleterious effect on the OLS estimates. The null hypothesis does 
not test whether or not the regressor and the explanatory variable are jointly determined but merely 
whether it causes the regression estimates to be biased. A rejection of the null indicates that 
endogenous regressors’ effects on the estimates are meaningful and instrumental variables 
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techniques are required. Under the null, the test variable is distributed Chi-squared with m degrees 
of freedom, where m is the number of regressors specified as endogenous in the model (Baum et al. 
2002). However, Nakamura and Nakamura (1998) point out that the power of the DWH test is 
positively related to the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous variable, which in 
cross-section data is often very low. As the instruments become less relevant, the power of the 
Hausman test decreases and the likelihood of falsly accepting exogeneity increases. Furthermore, 
they demonstrate that the DWH test is a test of existence of endogeneity, not the severity of such 
error implying that the DWH test may be significant and yet the OLS bias relatively small or in the 
case of type two error DWH test can be insignificant and the OLS bias relatively large.  Park and 
Davis (2000) note that if the instruments are weak, the IV estimator will be biased in the same 
direction as the OLS estimator and the loss of efficiency relative to OLS can be substantial. 
Following these words of warning a practical advice of Nakamura and Nakamura is accepted and 
both IV and OLS results are reported in this study. 
 
In order to test for the endogeneity and indeed to correct the estimates if needed, one needs to find 
instruments that are correlated with the endogenous variable, excluded from the main equation, and 
orthogonal to the disturbance process. The instruments to be used to test the endogeneity of 
commercialisation in the consumption equation are variables correlated with commercialisation but 
not directly with consumption. The distance to the nearest market is selected as the first instrument, 
as it is assumed to be a significant determinant of households’ decision to trade. However, it is 
unlikely that distance to the market has a significant direct effect on income over and above the 
indirect effect through commercialisation bearing in mind that the consumption (including own 
production) is measured at market prices. Distance will then not affect the income received from 
selling goods, or decrease the value of own production. It will, however, impact the buying and 
selling behaviour and this is where the indirect effect takes place. Distance can also be argued to be 
exogenous to the households considering the country specific circumstances in Tanzania, where 
tenure is traditionally long-lived. The land has usually been originally allocated by the chiefs and 
local leaders to each family and clan, who can then pass on the right to cultivate the land to their 
children (Mtetewaunga 1986). Most of the land is inherited from the parents and households are 
unlikely to move from the neighbourhood where they were born. In the unlikely event that a wage 
employment opportunity raises, individual family members may even move to the other side of the 
country, but most often the inherited land offers the main source of income and food security. 
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Despite the fact that formally speaking all land belongs to the state, and that legislation has been 
changed gradually to implement the heavily debated land reform programme aimed at transferring 
the ownership of land to the private sector, buying and selling land is still rather unusual in 
Tanzania. As concluded by Wily (2000) “The facts are these: despite a century of purposeful 
penetration by non-customary tenure ideology and legal provision, unregistered, customary tenure 
not only persists but is still by far the majority form of tenure in the region. None of the strategies 
adopted to ignore or diminish it have been successful.” This evidence from previous studies 
supports the view that distance to the market is exogenous determinant of market integration. 
 
Another instrument correlated only with commercialisation is related to market information and ties 
in to the same discussion of low social mobility. Even though informal sources of information are 
still dominant especially in rural Tanzania, the provision of market information is generally poor 
and news do not travel fast between the villages. People close to the market are likely to get 
relevant information directly from the market, but complementary sources of market information 
are the media (radio and TV) and telephone. These productive assets are used to gain information 
on the situation in other markets, likely supply and demand at the nearby market, and to gain other 
information on which to base the trading decisions on. The ownership of a radio, TV or a telephone 
has been used as a proxy for the household’s access to market information previously in the 
literature (see e.g. Heltberg and Tarp 2002) and the same assumption is used in this study. Even 
though the total value of the household assets is likely to have direct impact on household’s income, 
once the overall value of assets is controlled for, the type of assets that the household owns can be 
used as an indicator of the kind of productive resources that the household has available to them. 
Both of the above presented instruments are included as dummy variables, and they have also been 
interacted with the regional dummy variables to capture the differences of the effect in different 
areas of the country (e.g. the significance of distance in mountainous versus plain area).  
 
The task of selecting the instruments is a particularly important one as the reliability of the results 
relies on the validity of the instruments. Besides the theoretical justification discussed above, the 
instruments need to work for the dataset given. The Wu-Hausman test is vulnerable to the 
endogeneity of the instruments as it cannot differentiate between an exogenous explanatory variable 
and an endogenous instrument, on one hand, and an endogenous explanatory variable and 
exogenous instrument, on the other. Statistical testing of the instruments used is therefore and 
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prerequisite for the use of the Wu-Hausman test. A commonly used test for instrument validity is 
the so called Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions proposed by Sargan (1958). The joint null 
hypothesis of the test is that the excluded instruments are valid, i.e. that they are uncorrelated with 
the error term, and that they are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Under the null, the 
test statistics is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentification restrictions, i.e. the 
exogenous instruments. However, as the data was collected using primary sampling units, the 
clustering needs to be taking into account also when calculating the test statistics. As the Sargan 
statistics is not consistent in presence of heteroscedasticity, Hansen’s J statistic (Hansen 1982) is 
reported instead as it is robust to heteroscedasticity of unknown form. These test statistics are 
closely linked as, indeed, under conditional homoscedasticity, Hansen’s J becomes Sargan’s 
statistics (Hayashi 2000, pp. 227-228), and thus Hansen’s J is also known as Hansen-Sargan test 
statistics. The test statistics is specified as follows: 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )LKSgSSgnSSJ nn −→⋅= −−−−− 211111 ˆˆˆ'ˆˆˆ,ˆˆ χδδδ   (26) 
 
where n is the sample size, ( )( )1ˆˆ −Sgn δ  are the ortoghonality or moment conditions, and 1ˆ −S is the 
optimal weighting matrix (Hayashi 2000, p. 217). The estimator uses a cluster-robust optimal 
weighting matrix and the estimator is robust to arbitrary intra-cluster correlation.  
 
The test is based on a normal IV estimation with a continuous dependent variable and a normally 
distributed error term. However, as mentioned the commercialisation variable is defined as a 
proportion of the consumption that is bought from the market, i.e. as a proportion bound between 0 
and 1. Using OLS to create the predicted values for commercialisation is likely to lead predictions 
over 1 or under 0. Still, this does not cause problems when testing the instrument validity for the 
consumption equation as the IV is a single equation method and how the instrumented variable is 
modelled is irrelevant for the consistency. The test results of the Hansen-Sargan test are reported for 
all the equations together with the other estimation results. 
 
The possibility of endogeneity has been taken into account also in the estimation procedure and 
instrumental variable regression is used as an alternative way of estimating the consumption 
equation. Normally the endogenous variable (here: commercialisation) is first regressed on all 
exogenous variables in the system, and then the predicted values are used instead of the original 
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variable in the estimation. However, strictly speaking as commercialisation is not a linear function 
of its regressors, the estimates should not be used directly to replace commercialisation in the 
consumption equation as this would lead to invalid OLS standard errors, the consistency of the 
estimates would rely heavily on correctly specified model for commercialisation, and asymptotic 
variance of the estimator might be biased (Wooldridge 2002, pp. 623-625). Instead Wooldridge 
proposes estimating the commercialisation equation first, then taking the predicted values and using 
these as an exogenous instrument for commercialisation instead of using the original instruments 
directly. Even though the modified estimation procedure makes little difference to the obtained 
estimates, now the usual standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically valid. This 
specification has also an important robustness property as when using the predicted values of 
commercialisation as instrument, the model which gave the predictions does not have to be 
correctly specified. In this case the estimator for β is given by  
 
( ) YWXWIV ''ˆ 1−=β      (27) 
 
where W is the n x k matrix of instruments and here k =1. The robust Huber-White variance 
estimator is then 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 11 ''' −− Ω= XWWWXWV IVβ     (28) 
5.2 Commercialisation 
Explaining the determinants of commercialisation presents interesting methodological issues to be 
considered as here the dependent variable is a fraction of the household’s total consumption 
acquired through market transactions. Thus, the values of commercialisation are bound between 0 
and 1 so that 0 1hγ≤ ≤  where the extreme value 1 is reasonably common among wealthier urban 
dwellers. The standard least squares model is not equipped to cope with such limitations of the 
feasible values for the dependent variable. A commonly used replacement for cases when the 
dependent variable is bound between zero and one is the standard logit function ( )log / 1h hγ γ−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . 
However, this is not defined if γh takes on the extreme values 0 or 1 with positive probability. 
Consequently in any dataset where an observation γh equals 0 or 1 an adjustment must be made 
before computing the log-odds ratio. Commonly used but methodologically unsatisfactory 
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adjustment is to replace 0 and 1 with an arbitrary value very close to these extreme values. 
Especially when a large proportion of the observations take on the extreme values in the dataset 
used, adjusting the original observations is not desirable.  
 
As 16% of the unweighted observations in the Tanzanian sample reported buying all the goods they 
consumed from the market placing an arbitrary value instead of value 1 to be able to use the 
standard logistic function is not appropriate for the model. Instead in this study a Generalised Linear 
Model (GLM) approach presented by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) is used in the 
commercialisation equation to take into account the characteristics of the proportional dependent 
variable where the logit transformation is made for the expected value of the dependent variable2. 
For the estimation the functional form of the expected rate of commercialisation of household h, γh 
conditional on household characteristics Zh3 is defined as  
 
( ) ( )h h hE Gγ β=Z Z      (29) 
 
where Zh is a vector of household specific characteristics including distance to the nearest market 
and access to market information; household demographics (such as the household size, sex of the 
household head, education of the household head); information about household’s economic 
activities and assets (such as ownership of land, cattle, total assets); as well as regional and seasonal 
controls. ( )⋅G  is the link function which here is defined as a cumulative distribution function that is 
assumed to be the logistic function 
 
( ) ( )( )
exp
1 exp
h
h
h
Z
G
Z
ββ β= +Z      (30) 
 
                                                 
2 For other applications of the methodology see e.g. Hausman & Leonard (1997). 
3 The possibility of including consumption as an endogenous explanatory variable was also explored by including 
consumption and instrumented values for consumption in the commercialisation equation. The results were found to be 
very similar to but less robust than the specification where consumption is not included. As the theory does not suggest 
that consumption would directly cause commercialisation but the causality is likely to be reversed, and as the aim of the 
exercise is to identify plausible policy measures to enhance consumption through commercialisation, consumption was 
excluded from the list of explanatory variables in the commercialisation equation.  
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In other words, instead of taking the standard logit transformation of the dependent variable, i.e. 
ln
1
h
h h
h
E Z Zγ βγ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
, the current approach transforms the expected value of the estimate 
instead, i.e. ( ) ( )( )
exp
1 exp
h
h h
h
Z
E Z
Z
βγ β= + . The latter is always defined whereas the former is not if the 
dependent variable takes on values 1 or 0. The parameters in (29) can be estimated using maximum 
likelihood technique where the likelihood for an observation is specified as the Bernoulli log-
likelihood, i.e.  
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
exp exp
ln 1 ln 1
1 exp 1 exp
h h
h h h
h h
Z Z
L
Z Z
β βγ γβ β
⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤= + − −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦
  (31) 
 
These estimates are consistent as long as the conditional expectation (29) is correctly specified even 
if the Bernoulli specification is incorrect (Papke and Wooldridge 1996). The maximisation problem 
is then 
 
( )
1
max
H
h h
h
Lβ β=∑ Z      (32) 
 
As mentioned, the households have been selected in two stages by first selecting the sampling unit 
and then households to be interviewed within the sample. The possibility that the sampling errors 
are correlated within the sampling unit but not across the units is taken into account when 
calculating the variances by using the robust sandwich estimator. Here the variance is defined as  
 
( ) ( ) ∧
=
′∧∧ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∑ VuuV M
k
G
k
G
k
1
ν       (33) 
 
where 
1
2
2 ln
−∧
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−= β
LV i.e. the conventional estimator of variance, which here is the inverse of the 
estimated information matrix. This matrix has been adjusted by the score weights for each cluster 
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group. ( )Gku  is the contribution of the kth group to the scores 
2
ln ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
β
L . (Rogers 1993, Williams 
2000, Wooldridge 2002) This formula is asymptotically correct, but as the sample is not infinite, the 
matrix is multiplied by 
1−M
M  for finite sample correction, even though in such a large sample this 
correction does not have large practical significance. The resulting quasi-maximum likelihood 
model is estimated using Newton-Raphson optimisation. 
 
6 Results 
6.1 Households’ total consumption 
As described above, the estimation of the total consumption per adult equivalent was done by using 
OLS and IV with a correction for robust standard errors. The estimation results are presented below 
in table 1. Whether or not the endogeneity bias was in fact present was tested for all model 
specifications. The results suggest that in most cases there was no endogeneity bias present. On the 
other hand, the correction for possible endogeneity had little impact on the estimations as a whole 
and the coefficients for the instrumented variables turned out to be very similar to the results from 
pure commercialisation. In fact in some cases the coefficient for the instrumented variable was even 
higher than for pure commercialisation as the instruments, such as distance to the markets, are 
likely to capture a wider range of elements determining income generation that are related to 
isolation from the market and transaction costs. Only for the urban sub-sample the coefficient 
estimate for the commercialisation falls substantially when instrumented variables are used instead 
of the actual ones (see appendix). This does not undermine the importance of commercialisation in 
urban areas but is likely to imply that the instruments used, i.e. distance to the market and access to 
market information, are not as powerful elements to determine market integration in urban areas as 
they are in rural areas where distances are longer and access poses a real problem for the 
households. The instruments generally passed the Hansen-Sargan test for instrumental validity 
which tests whether or not the instruments are orthogonal to the error process but is silent on the 
impact of the instruments. On the whole, the estimates for commercialisation remain very robust 
through all specifications. 
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Furthermore, other possibly endogenous variables that are important contributors to welfare are 
sources of cash income and employment category. Even though these characteristics are likely to 
determine household’s welfare, it may also be that their occupational choice is related to income, 
e.g. only rich households sell agricultural output as they can afford to do so. The model is estimated 
and the results are presented with and without these possibly endogenous categories. The exclusion 
of the variables has practically no impact on the other coefficients but it worsens the fit of the 
model, as was to be expected. Finally, the model is estimated over the whole sample as well as 
separately for urban and rural areas, since the pooling test of joint significance of all interaction 
terms indicate that a simple pooled model is not sufficient. The results for the rural and urban 
samples separately are included as an appendix. 
 
On the whole, the model seems to fit the data well as around 20 percent of the variation in the 
household total expenditure can be explained in all the models. Also Ramsey’s RESET is passed in 
all full models at the conventional five percent confidence level and thus the null hypothesis of no 
omitted variables or incorrect functional form is maintained. The reduced form of the equation 
commonly fails the RESET for known reasons: important explanatory variables such as 
employment category, have been deliberately omitted to demonstrate the robustness of other results.  
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TABLE 1: COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR HOUSEHOLD TOTAL CONSUMPTION PER ADULT 
EQUIVALENT FOR 28 DAYS (POOLED MODEL) 
 
  Reduced OLS Reduced IV Full OLS Full IV 
Commercialisation 0.489*** - 0.408*** - 
  (13.46) - (11.03) - 
Predicted values - 0.476*** - 0.303* 
  - (3.05) - (1.93) 
HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHICS 
HH has only 1 member † † † † 
  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HH has 2-6 family members -0.527*** -0.527*** -0.543*** -0.543*** 
  (31.07) (31.00) (32.54) (32.50) 
HH has 7 or more members -0.895*** -0.897*** -0.925*** -0.926*** 
  (44.94) (44.98) (47.17) (47.29) 
HH head is male -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 
  (0.82) (0.80) (0.85) (0.90) 
HH head age  -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (2.56) (2.81) (2.61) (2.86) 
HH head sick in last 4 weeks 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 
  (2.90) (2.83) (3.11) (3.04) 
HH head has no education † † † † 
  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HH head has primary education 0.018 0.016 0.020 0.019 
  (1.31) (1.13) (1.49) (1.43) 
HH head has secondary educ. 0.025 0.024 0.028 0.029 
  (1.30) (1.20) (1.46) (1.48) 
HH head has higher education 0.056** 0.055** 0.061*** 0.061*** 
  (2.49) (2.44) (2.76) (2.73) 
MAIN ACTIVITY IS FARMING 
The main activity of the HH  0.011 0.012 0.014 0.013 
head is farming/livestock (0.89) (0.92) (1.11) (1.04)   
PRODUCTIVE ASSETS 
log of assets  0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 
  (0.62) (0.79) (0.68) (0.94) 
HH has no land  † † † † 
  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HH owns max 2 acres of land -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.037** -0.041** 
  (3.40) (2.85) (2.47) (2.46) 
HH owns 2-10 acres of land -0.015 -0.015 0.003 -0.002 
  (0.85) (0.70) (0.17) (0.09) 
HH owns more than 10 acres   0.056** 0.052* 0.088*** 0.083*** 
  (2.09) (1.84) (3.30) (3.08) 
HH has 1-10 cows 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 
  (4.99) (4.93) (5.00) (4.93) 
HH has more than 10 cows 0.056* 0.059* 0.067** 0.070** 
  (1.74) (1.81) (2.11) (2.20) 
HH has 1-10 sheep 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.029** 0.026* 
  (2.87) (2.59) (2.10) (1.77) 
HH has more than 10 sheep 0.073*** 0.075*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 
  (3.27) (3.28) (2.73) (2.67) 
HH has access to electricity 0.295*** 0.295*** 0.278*** 0.281*** 
  (17.67) (15.81) (17.19) (16.34) 
INCOME SOURCES 
HH sells agricultural output - - 0.120*** 0.116*** 
    (8.75) (7.88) 
HH sells non-farm output - - 0.119*** 0.121*** 
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    (10.55) (9.75) 
MAIN SOURCE OF CASH 
HH’s main source of cash is  † † † † 
agriculture  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HH's main source of cash is - - 0.165*** 0.176*** 
wage or business income - - (11.04) (8.74) 
HH's main source of cash is - - -0.023 -0.018 
remittances or other undefined - - (1.29) (0.99) 
SEASONAL VARIATION 
January  † † † † 
  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
February  0.027 0.026 0.029 0.027 
  (1.37) (1.36) (1.51) (1.42) 
March  0.010 0.011 0.012 0.011 
  (0.49) (0.52) (0.56) (0.54) 
April  0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 
  (0.05) (0.08) (0.00) (0.16) 
May  -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 
  (0.28) (0.27) (0.34) (0.37) 
June  -0.034 -0.031 -0.037* -0.035* 
  (1.58) (1.45) (1.74) (1.65) 
July  0.036* 0.035* 0.029 0.028 
  (1.74) (1.68) (1.42) (1.37) 
August  0.021 0.021 0.012 0.011 
  (1.02) (1.00) (0.61) (0.54) 
September  0.034* 0.035* 0.029 0.030 
  (1.66) (1.71) (1.43) (1.50) 
October  -0.017 -0.018 -0.025 -0.026 
  (0.87) (0.93) (1.30) (1.31) 
November  0.027 0.029 0.022 0.024 
  (1.39) (1.45) (1.16) (1.21) 
December  0.117*** 0.117*** 0.122*** 0.123*** 
  (5.61) (5.57) (5.88) (5.91) 
REGIONAL VARIATION 
HH lives in urban area 0.021 0.025 0.014 0.031 
  (0.97) (0.67) (0.63) (0.92) 
Dodoma  † † † † 
  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Arusha  -0.160*** -0.162*** -0.125*** -0.120*** 
  (3.72) (3.61) (2.89) (2.64) 
Kilimanjaro  -0.094** -0.090** -0.047 -0.032 
  (2.30) (1.97) (1.16) (0.68) 
Tanga  -0.014 -0.011 0.029 0.040 
  (0.34) (0.25) (0.71) (0.92) 
Morogoro  0.089** 0.091** 0.129*** 0.135*** 
  (1.99) (1.99) (2.96) (3.04) 
Pwani  -0.035 -0.032 -0.012 0.002 
  (0.78) (0.65) (0.27) (0.04) 
Dar es Salaam  0.037 0.039 0.076* 0.085* 
  (0.80) (0.83) (1.68) (1.81) 
Lindi  0.031 0.033 0.060 0.067 
  (0.54) (0.57) (1.04) (1.15) 
Mtwara  -0.024 -0.020 -0.004 0.004 
  (0.40) (0.34) (0.07) (0.06) 
Ruvuma  -0.026 -0.019 -0.010 -0.003 
  (0.53) (0.39) (0.22) (0.07) 
Iringa  0.168*** 0.164*** 0.185*** 0.182*** 
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  (3.19) (3.12) (3.68) (3.64) 
Mbeya  0.121*** 0.121*** 0.169*** 0.172*** 
  (2.89) (2.88) (4.01) (4.04) 
Singida  -0.113*** -0.102** -0.100** -0.089** 
  (2.63) (2.43) (2.34) (2.13) 
Tabora  0.169*** 0.173*** 0.204*** 0.216*** 
  (3.46) (3.41) (4.38) (4.42) 
Rukwa  -0.097** -0.095** -0.063 -0.058 
  (2.08) (2.04) (1.38) (1.27) 
Kigoma  0.102** 0.105** 0.114** 0.122** 
  (2.10) (2.11) (2.38) (2.48) 
Shinyanga  0.224*** 0.228*** 0.247*** 0.250*** 
  (5.18) (5.25) (5.78) (5.82) 
Kagera  0.232*** 0.234*** 0.247*** 0.250*** 
  (5.48) (5.55) (5.78) (5.86) 
Mwanza  -0.069 -0.075 -0.017 -0.009 
  (1.43) (1.41) (0.35) (0.18) 
Mara  -0.284*** -0.280*** -0.228*** -0.207*** 
  (4.53) (4.27) (3.73) (3.19) 
Constant  9.435*** 9.440*** 9.328*** 9.383*** 
  (148.60) (87.77) (148.63) (91.24) 
 
Observations  21723 21530 21723 21530 
 
R-squared  0.24 0.20 0.26 0.16 
 
RESET test  5.30*** 3.37** 1.35 0.14 
Prob > F  0.001 0.018 0.257 0.935 
 
Hansen-Sargan  - 89.203 - 88.163 
Prob > Chi-sq   - 0.161 - 0.181 
 
Endogeneity test 0.00 - 0.44 - 
Prob > F  0.947 - 0.509 - 
 
Pooling test  2.05*** 95.09*** 1.85*** 87.65*** 
Prob > F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
† denotes base category 
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As the theory suggests and these results confirm commercialisation has a significant positive effect 
on consumption. A one percentage point increase in commercialisation leads to, on average and 
ceteris paribus, 0.3-0.5 percentage increase in the consumption in the pooled sample, 0.5-0.7 
percentage increase in rural areas, and 0.1-0.4 percentage increase in urban areas, respectively. This 
is a sizable effect which implies that commercialisation has a strong potential as a tool in the fight 
against poverty especially in the rural areas where the households face largest barriers for trade. The 
current average commercialisation rate in Tanzania is 63 percent when the sample is adjusted for 
the total population and even though none of the households lives in total subsistence, there is 
considerable scope for improvement.  
 
On average, households with only one member consume more per capita as do larger families. This 
result was to be expected as households usually share durable goods, which are counted only once 
for the whole household. However, the larger the family size is, the lower the per capita 
expenditure, which implies that not only are the common goods shared with larger number of 
people, but the consumption of individual goods is also lower per person. This empirical result is 
commonly found in literature (see e.g. Lipton & Ravallion 1995, Deaton and Paxton 1998) even 
though it is in contrast with the economic theory of economies of households due to sharing of 
household public goods (Lanjouw & Ravallion 1995). The majority of empirical findings from 
different countries still show that larger households consume less per capita, which is the case also 
in Tanzania. The sex of the household head is not statistically significant determinant of household 
consumption in the sample. Even though there are far fewer households headed by women, 
controlling for all other explanatory factors the sex of the household head alone does not have an 
effect on household income. On the other hand the age of the household head is a well determined 
factor of consumption implying that the older the head of the household, the smaller the average 
consumption of a household member. The age effect is still very small, on average 0.1 percent per 
year, and thus the lower consumption due to the head of the household mostly impacts households 
headed by over 60 year-olds (13% of the sample) who might no longer be as efficient in acquiring 
income for the household as the younger household heads may be, and the older household heads 
are also more likely to have larger extended households to look after. The oldest member of the 
household is still often selected as the household head even though he/she might not be the most 
educated or best equipped for making decisions of using the household resources. Somewhat 
counter intuitively, if the household head has been ill or injured during the period when the 
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consumption has been measured, the total expenditure seems to be larger than otherwise. Even 
though well determined, the sickness only increases the consumption by three percent in the pooled 
sample, one percent in the rural sample and four percent in the urban sample. This might be caused 
by the household’s attempt to nurture the household head back into health by borrowing or 
depleting stocks in order to get him/her back into more productive activities as soon as possible. 
Rural households might not have as much leverage to increase their consumption as the urban 
households have in times of crises and thus their consumption is close to unaffected. Education, on 
the other hand, has the expected positive effect on total consumption. The more educated the 
household head is, the higher the average consumption of the household members, even though the 
impact of basic education is rather small, controlling for other factors. If the household head has 
higher education after the secondary school, the total consumption of a household member is six 
percent greater compared to a household head with no education in the pooled sample. In the rural 
areas where educated people are on short supply returns to education are even greater: A household 
head with secondary education in rural areas consume, on average and ceteris paribus, 10-11 
percent more than a household whose head has no education.  
 
Economic activities of the household are further possible determinants of consumption. Whether or 
not the household head is a farmer or not does not have a statistically significant impact on 
consumption most likely as farming is so common across both rich and poor groups in rural and 
urban Tanzania. However, in the full models where other information on economic activities are 
included a household that engages in selling agricultural output consumes, on average and ceteris 
paribus, 11-13 percent more than a household that does not engage in trade in all samples. The 
same applies to households that sell non-farm output where the welfare gain is 13, 9, and 15 percent 
if a household sells non-agricultural products in pooled, rural and urban samples, respectively. Thus 
whether or not the household engages in selling matters and the gains are sizable irrespective of the 
goods sold. On the employment side, if household’s main source of cash is wage, salary or other 
business income the household consumption is 18-20 percent higher in all models on average and 
ceteris paribus compared to the households where the main source of cash is from agriculture. Thus 
employment opportunities, often associated with further commercialisation, are important 
determinants of income. On the other hand, households depending on remittances, transfers and 
other casual cash earning opportunities are worse off than households who have more reliable cash 
income from agriculture, even though this impact is not statistically significant. 
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The type of assets owned seems to matter more than the total value of the assets in terms of 
household’s total consumption. Households owning only small plots of land are worse off than 
households without any land, which are often urban dwellers. Still, owning larger plots of land has a 
significant positive impact on consumption in the rural areas as was to be expected. Also owning 
cattle and sheep are positively related to consumption, cattle more so in the rural areas and sheep in 
the urban areas. Especially cattle are often used not only as help in cultivation but also as a means 
of investment and an indicator of wealth in Tanzania.  
 
Consumption does not vary significantly over different calendar months apart from a peak in 
December. This is explained by the holiday season which boosts the average consumption by 12-13 
percent on average in the whole country, 6-7 percent in rural areas and 13-14 percent in urban areas, 
compared to January, which was used as a base. Regional variation, on the other hand, is much 
larger across the regions. Also living in an urban area as such, after all other explanatory factors 
have been controlled for, has a positive but not statistically significant impact on consumption. This 
implies that even though consumption levels are lower in rural areas, these differences are 
explained by other factors, such as employment opportunities, integration to the markets and access 
to education, rather than living in rural areas as such. The regional comparison category was 
Dodoma in central Tanzania, which represents a considerably sizable region with average mean 
income levels including both rural and urban areas. As was found in the final report of the 
Household Budget Survey 2000/01 (NBS 2002b) consumption expenditure per capita varies 
considerably across the regions and these differences are not washed away by the other explanatory 
variables in the model. Living in the capital area has an expected positive and significant impact on 
consumption of urban population boosting it by 10-15 percent on average and ceteris paribus.   
 
Disaggregating the results even further reveals, that the difference in the consumption levels in the 
rural and urban areas is largely due to the endowment effect, i.e. rural households make as effective 
use of their resources as urban households but their worse-off position is due to lack of 
endowments. The most sizable endowment effect comes from wage earning possibility and access 
to electricity, both of which are much more common in urban areas and have sizable effect on total 
consumption. Statistically the most significant difference in the treatment is for land, cattle and 
sheep as was to be expected, but also commercialisation and selling non-farm output had a 
significant interaction effect with the urban dummy which implies that different types of 
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commercialisation efforts have different impact in rural and urban areas, as seen in the estimation 
results above. 
6.3 Commercialisation 
As described in section 5.2 commercialisation equation was modelled using generalised linear 
model (GLM) technique, which was estimated using the Newton-Raphson maximum likelihood 
estimation. As above, the results are presented with and without the employment categories that 
might be affected by commercialisation. The results were calculated firstly for the whole sample 
and then separately for the rural and the urban sub-samples as splitting the sample was suggested by 
the likelihood ratio test. The resulting models fit the data well and are able to explain around 40 
percent of the variation in the observed commercialisation over the whole sample, and around 20-30 
percent in the sub-samples. Furthermore, even though the RESET for omitted variables or incorrect 
functional form is failed for the pooled sample, the test is passed in the urban and rural sub-samples 
at the conventional five percent level, as they succeed better in explaining commercialisation than 
the pooled sample alone. Still, the RESET is based on OLS estimation, and thus the results of the 
test should be interpreted with caution. The estimation results are presented in the table 2. As log 
odds ratios are not intuitively appealing, the results are transformed into impact effects of each 
dummy variable. The table presents the predicted commercialisation for an imaginary household 
with mean characteristics on the continuous variable ‘assets’ and for whom all dummy variables 
take the value of zero. This base is constructed to be highly disadvantaged rural household with no 
education, land, cattle, sheep, or radio; who earn most of their cash income from agriculture; lives 
in the base category region Dodoma and is interviewed in the base month January. Each dummy 
variable is then introduced one at the time and the new predicted rate of commercialisation, as well 
as the deviation from the base, is calculated to show explicitly the impact of each dummy variable. 
The deviations from the base occur singly.  
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Table 2: Commercialisation rates(a by Household characteristics 
 
 POOLED POOLED RURAL RURAL URBAN           URBAN 
 Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced Full 
Base(b 0.72 0.66 0.63 0.56 0.88 0.84 
Deviation(c (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ACCESS TO MARKET INFORMATION 
Radio, TV or 0.73 0.68 0.64 0.57 0.89 0.85 
telephone (0.01)*** (0.01)** (0.01)* (0.01) (0.01)***          (0.01)** 
DISTANCE TO THE NEAREST MARKET 
within 1 km † † † † † † 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
1 km 0.72 0.66 0.62 0.55 0.88 0.85 
 (0.00) (0.00) (-0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
2 km 0.68 0.63 0.59 0.53 0.86 0.82 
 (-0.04)*** (-0.03)*** (-0.04)*** (-0.03)*** (-0.02)**         (-0.02)** 
3 km 0.67 0.61 0.57 0.50 0.85 0.82 
 (-0.05)*** (-0.05)*** (-0.06)*** (-0.06)*** (-0.02)***       (-0.02)** 
4 km 0.68 0.64 0.58 0.52 0.87 0.83 
 (-0.04)*** (-0.03)** (-0.05)*** (-0.04)** (-0.01) (-0.01) 
5 km 0.68 0.64 0.60 0.53 0.81 0.78 
 (-0.04)** (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.02) (-0.07)***       (-0.06)** 
6 km 0.63 0.58 0.54 0.48 0.82 0.78 
 (-0.09)*** (-0.08)*** (-0.09)*** (-0.08)*** (-0.06)** (-0.06)* 
7 km 0.71 0.66 0.62 0.55 0.91 0.89 
 (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.05) 
8 km 0.66 0.61 0.57 0.52 0.73 0.64 
 (-0.06)** (-0.05) (-0.06)* (-0.04) (-0.15)**         (-0.19)** 
9 km 0.64 0.59 0.55 0.50 0.86 0.80 
 (-0.08)** (-0.07)* (-0.08)** (-0.06) (-0.02) (-0.04) 
10 km or more 0.64 0.60 0.56 0.50 0.80 0.78 
 (-0.08)*** (-0.07)*** (-0.07)*** (-0.06)*** (-0.08)***       (-0.06)** 
HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHICS 
only 1 member † † † † † † 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
2-6 family 0.73 0.67 0.60 0.53 0.90 0.86 
members (0.01) (0.01) (-0.03)** (-0.03)* (0.02)***        (0.02)*** 
7 or more 0.72 0.66 0.59 0.52 0.90 0.86 
members (0.00) (0.00) (-0.04)*** (-0.04)*** (0.02)***         (0.02)** 
HH head is 0.71 0.66 0.62 0.55 0.87 0.83 
male (-0.01)* (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
HH head has † † † † † † 
no education (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HH head has 0.74 0.68 0.64 0.57 0.89 0.85 
primary educ. (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.01) (0.01)* (0.01)***        (0.01)*** 
HH head has 0.75 0.69 0.64 0.57 0.90 0.87 
secondary educ. (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)***        (0.03)*** 
HH head has 0.72 0.67 0.63 0.56 0.88 0.84 
higher educ. (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
FARMING/LIVESTOCK AS THE MAIN ACTIVITY 
Main activity is 0.70 0.65 0.62 0.55 0.86 0.82 
farming (-0.02)*** (-0.02)*** (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.02)***     (-0.02)*** 
PRODUCTIVE ASSETS 
HH has no land † † † † † † 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HH owns max 0.60 0.56 0.54 0.48 0.80 0.77 
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2 acres of land (-0.12)*** (-0.10)*** (-0.09)*** (-0.08)*** (-0.08)***     (-0.07)*** 
HH owns 2-10 0.57 0.55 0.52 0.48 0.77 0.75 
acres of land (-0.15)*** (-0.11)*** (-0.11)*** (0.08)*** (-0.11)***     (-0.09)*** 
HH owns > 10 0.60 0.59 0.55 0.50 0.80 0.79 
acres of land (-0.12)*** (-0.08)*** (-0.08)*** (-0.05)*** (-0.08)***     (-0.05)*** 
1-10 cows 0.71 0.66 0.63 0.56 0.86 0.83 
 (-0.01)* (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (-0.02)***       (-0.01)** 
> 10 cows 0.69 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.87 0.84 
 (-0.03)** (-0.01) (-0.03)* (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.00) 
 1-10 sheep 0.69 0.63 0.62 0.55 0.84 0.80 
 (-0.03)*** (-0.03)*** (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.04)***     (-0.04)*** 
> 10 sheep 0.70 0.64 0.64 0.56 0.85 0.81 
 (-0.02)* (-0.02)** (0.01) (0.00) (-0.03)***     (-0.03)*** 
HH has access 0.81 0.74 0.76 0.67 0.92 0.88 
to electricity (0.09)*** (0.07)*** (0.13)*** (0.11)*** (0.04)***        (0.04)*** 
INCOME SOURCES 
HH sells - 0.62 - 0.54 - 0.78 
agricultural output (-0.05)*** - (-0.02)** -                     (-0.06)*** 
HH sells non- - 0.71 - 0.63 - 0.86 
farm output - (0.05)*** - (0.07)*** -                      (0.02)*** 
MAIN SOURCES OF CASH 
agriculture † † † † † † 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
wage or - 0.78 - 0.69 - 0.90 
business income- (0.11)*** - (0.13)*** -                      (0.06)*** 
remittances or - 0.66 - 0.55 - 0.83 
other undefined - (0.00) - (-0.01) - (-0.01) 
SEASONAL VARIATION 
January † † † † † † 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
February 0.70 0.64 0.63 0.54 0.87 0.82 
 (-0.02)** (-0.02)** (0.00) (-0.02) (-0.01)**         (-0.02)** 
March 0.70 0.63 0.61 0.53 0.86 0.82 
 (-0.02)*** (-0.03)*** (-0.02) (-0.03) (-0.01)**         (-0.02)** 
April 0.70 0.65 0.62 0.55 0.87 0.83 
 (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
May 0.70 0.64 0.68 0.60 0.85 0.81 
 (-0.02) (-0.02)* (0.05)** (0.05)* (-0.03)***     (-0.03)*** 
June 0.71 0.65 0.68 0.60 0.86 0.82 
 (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.05)** (0.04)** (-0.02)**         (-0.02)** 
July 0.72 0.66 0.70 0.62 0.85 0.81 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.07)*** (0.06)*** (-0.02)***     (-0.02)*** 
August 0.71 0.65 0.69 0.61 0.85 0.81 
 (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.06)*** (0.05)** (-0.03)***     (-0.03)*** 
September 0.73 0.67 0.71 0.63 0.87 0.82 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.08)*** (0.07)*** (-0.01)* (-0.01)* 
October 0.74 0.68 0.71 0.63 0.88 0.84 
 (0.02)* (0.02) (0.08)*** (0.07)*** (0.00) (0.00) 
November 0.72 0.66 0.68 0.60 0.87 0.83 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.05)*** (0.05)** (-0.01) (-0.01) 
December 0.74 0.69 0.69 0.62 0.88 0.85 
 (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.01) (0.01) 
REGIONAL VARIATION 
HH lives in 0.87 0.82 - - - - 
urban area (0.15)*** (0.15)*** - - - - 
Dodoma † † † † † † 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
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Arusha 0.81 0.76 0.75 0.69 0.91 0.88 
 (0.09)*** (0.10)*** (0.12)*** (0.14)*** (0.03)* (0.04)* 
Kilimanjaro 0.83 0.80 0.81 0.77 0.91 0.90 
 (0.11)*** (0.14)*** (0.18)*** (0.21)*** (0.03)*            (0.06)*** 
Tanga 0.80 0.77 0.73 0.68 0.92 0.90 
 (0.08)*** (0.10)*** (0.10)*** (0.12)*** (0.04)***        (0.06)*** 
Morogoro 0.75 0.71 0.67 0.62 0.90 0.87 
 (0.03) (0.05)** (0.04) (0.07)** (0.03) (0.03)* 
Pwani 0.84 0.80 0.80 0.75 0.94 0.91 
 (0.12)*** (0.14)*** (0.17)*** (0.19)*** (0.06)***        (0.07)*** 
Dar es Salaam 0.83 0.78 0.88 0.83 0.92 0.89 
 (0.11)*** (0.12)*** (0.25)*** (0.27)*** (0.04)***        (0.05)*** 
Lindi 0.75 0.71 0.67 0.62 0.90 0.87 
 (0.03) (0.05)* (0.04) (0.06)* (0.02) (0.03) 
Mtwara 0.72 0.67 0.65 0.60 0.88 0.84 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ruvuma 0.69 0.64 0.60 0.55 0.87 0.83 
 (-0.03) (-0.02) (-0.03) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
Iringa 0.71 0.65 0.65 0.59 0.87 0.81 
 (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (-0.01) (-0.02) 
Mbeya 0.72 0.82 0.65 0.60 0.88 0.85 
 (0.00) (0.15) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) 
Singida 0.75 0.69 0.64 0.58 0.91 0.86 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)* (0.02) 
Tabora 0.78 0.74 0.66 0.60 0.93 0.91 
 (0.06)*** (0.08)*** (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)***        (0.07)*** 
Rukwa 0.74 0.69 0.67 0.62 0.88 0.85 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)* (0.06)** (0.00) (0.01) 
Kigoma 0.75 0.72 0.70 0.66 0.89 0.86 
 (0.03) (0.05)** (0.07)** (0.10)*** (0.01) (0.02) 
Shinyanga 0.71 0.64 0.62 0.56 0.88 0.83 
 (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (-0.01) 
Kagera 0.71 0.66 0.65 0.60 0.86 0.82 
 (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (-0.02) (-0.02) 
Mwanza 0.85 0.82 0.81 0.77 0.94 0.93 
 (0.13)*** (0.16)*** (0.18)*** (0.21)*** (0.06)***        (0.09)*** 
Mara 0.89 0.86 0.84 0.79 0.96 0.95 
 (0.17)*** (0.19)*** (0.21)*** (0.24)*** (0.08)***        (0.11)*** 
 
a) Commercialisation rate estimates based on the GLM estimates of the models reported in table 3.8. 
b) The base category is defined as one with sample average for and assets. The base household is located in Dodoma 
and interviewed in January.  
c) Deviations from the base occur singly. 
 
* denotes that the dummy is significant at 5%; ** denotes that the dummy is significant at 1% 
† denotes base category  
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As the theory predicts, the results show that commercialisation, i.e. how large a proportion of the 
household consumption is acquired through market transaction, is dependent on informal barriers 
for trade. Access to market information, here proxied by owning a radio, TV or a telephone, is 
statistically highly significant determinant for commercialisation, but its impact is limited to one 
percentage point on average and ceteris paribus. The statistical significance implies that access to 
information matters but relatively small magnitude suggests that owning a radio may not capture the 
important parts of market information. Social networks are likely to be more prominent sources of 
market information, and thus distance to the market is likely to reflect easiness of gaining market 
information directly from the traders. Distance to the market also reflects the effort of transport and 
time it takes to reach the market. As the distance increases, also the level of commercialisation falls 
rapidly. Already being two kilometres away from the market decreases the commercialisation by 
four percentage points in rural areas and two percentage points in urban areas, on average and 
ceteris paribus. As the distance increases, also the commercialisation rates drop in a non-linear 
fashion, and households located at least ten kilometres from the markets are likely to be 6-8 
percentage points less commercialised than households within one kilometre from the nearest 
market, on average and ceteris paribus. The relative importance of even the first kilometres from 
the market highlights the fact that transport and travelling creates high transaction costs. As 
travelling on poor road network requires time and resources even smaller distances isolate 
households effectively from trade and trading information. The impact of distance is largely similar 
both in rural and urban areas. 
 
Also the household demographics matter. As family size expands, household is more able to send 
one of its members to the market and thus, the larger the household, the more commercialised it is 
likely to be in urban areas. However, in the rural areas large family size means lower 
commercialisation as the household members are more likely to be able to produce most of the 
goods at home. Whether the household is headed by a man or a woman, on the other hand, has no 
statistical significance on household’s commercialisation. Then again the education of the 
household head is statistically significant factor boosting household’s commercialisation especially 
in urban areas. Better education is likely to increase the household’s integration within the market 
as the head is better able to process market information. Primary education that is likely to proxy 
basic mathematical, reading, and writing skills facilitates household decision-making. Still, on the 
whole the size of this impact is rather modest varying from 0-3 percentage points on average and 
ceteris paribus.   
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Different indicators for agricultural activities decrease the estimated commercialisation throughout 
the line. If the main economic activity of the household head is farming, the household is likely to 
be 1-2 percentage points less commercialised on average and ceteris paribus. The modest effect is 
likely to reflect the commonness of farming: as the majority of the households are cultivating 
agricultural output, being a farmer looses its power to discriminate between more and less 
commercialised households. However, different types of agricultural activities and assets help to dig 
deeper into the determinants of commercialisation. Especially the size of land owned impacts 
commercialisation: landless households have very little possibilities to cultivate sufficient amount 
of food whereas households with more than ten acres of land are likely to cover their own demand 
for food and possibly even produce surplus. Furthermore, if the household owns cattle or sheep it is 
likely to be a relatively well-off farmer and thus it is more likely to produce sufficient amount of 
food at home and be less commercialised than a household who owns other types of assets. The 
magnitude of the assets as such, however, has little impact on commercialisation. Having access to 
main grid electricity, on the other hand, has a large positive effect on commercialisation: four 
percentage points in urban areas and up to thirteen percentage points in rural areas, respectively, on 
average and ceteris paribus. This may not be purely the result of electricity as such, but a proxy for 
household’s location with respect to major roads and thus access to larger and more reliable 
markets. Households with electricity are also likely to be richer, and the electricity variable may 
then also indicate a wealth effect not already captured by the other variables. 
 
In the full model the results show that commercialisation is significantly related to whether or not 
the household is selling either agricultural products or non-farm products and services. These 
impacts are large and well determined. Especially in rural areas a household is likely to be seven 
percentage points more commercialised if it engages in selling non-farm production, whereas in the 
pooled sample a household is likely to be five percentage points more commercialised. Selling 
agricultural production, on the other hand, decreases the commercialisation rates by five percentage 
points in the pooled sample, two in the rural sample and six in the urban sample, respectively, on 
average and ceteris paribus. If a household is selling agricultural production, it is likely to have 
surplus of food crops and be more than self-sufficient in food. As the consumption aggregate is 
constructed mainly on everyday consumption, a large part of it is food which in these households is 
produced at home decreasing the proportion of consumption acquired from the market. On the other 
hand, if the household sells non-farm products and services, it is more likely to have diversified its 
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income sources away from agriculture into other, possibly more profitable sectors and may not 
produce sufficient quantities of food but prefers buying it from the markets. The fact that the 
consumption aggregate constructed for the analysis is based on daily consumption items, i.e. mainly 
food, allows this conclusion to be tentatively drawn. Furthermore, one of the most influential 
determinants of commercialisation is having wage or business income as the main source of cash. 
These households are likely to sell their labour rather than use it for cultivating their own food. The 
impact is large4 as the reference category is having agriculture as the main identified source of 
income. This highlights the importance and the potential of diversifying households’ livelihood 
strategies beyond agriculture especially in the rural areas if further commercialisation and, indeed, 
consumption is to be achieved. The households in the comparison group, by definition, are likely to 
grow their own food and sell their surplus to the markets.  
 
Seasonal variation of commercialisation raises an important point for discussion. The variation is 
much larger in rural areas, where the supply of goods is less reliable and the roads might be 
impassable during the rainy season. Still, the variation seems to be more related to the harvest 
season. The main harvest season between July and December boosts the goods available at the 
markets and also increases commercialisation rates substantially. On the other hand, early in the 
year during the ploughing and cultivation, the prices at the markets are likely to go up as the supply 
decreases and the households must rely on their own stocks. Unfortunately, the HBS did not collect 
price information which could be used to verify the seasonal price changes, and deriving unit prices 
from total values of the monthly consumption is likely to lead to estimation errors possibly greater 
than the seasonal variation in prices. Thus the speculation about prices presented here cannot be 
verified using the data at hand. In the urban areas, seasonal variation is much more limited as the 
markets are more reliable and stable, which also leads to more stable levels of commercialisation. 
The urban and rural commercialisation also seems to vary into opposite directions during the year: 
the harvest season boosts commercialisation in rural areas as the households gain cash income they 
can use to buy goods from the market. The urban commercialisation, on the other hand, is more 
stable.  
 
Besides seasonal variation, also regional variation outperforms household characteristics as 
explanatory variables for commercialisation. This implies that region specific fixed effects are 
                                                 
4 11 percentage points in the pooled sample, 13 percentage points in the rural sample and 6 percentage points in the 
urban sample, on average and ceteris paribus. 
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larger determinants of commercialisation than the factors related to the individual households. Even 
after controlling for the households’ access to the nearest market, the size of that market, reliability 
of the supply, and the links to other markets are crucial in households’ decision to specialise. This 
further emphasises the importance of regional market structure, infrastructure and overall trade 
environment that are influencing the households’ decision on market integration. Especially Arusha 
and Kilimanjaro with large markets near the Kenyan boarder, Tanga with its international harbour 
and good connections to both Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam as the commercial capital, 
Mara and Mwanza next to the Lake Victoria with train connections and airports as well as direct 
access to Uganda, and finally Pwani in the immediate surroundings of Dar es Salaam are 
particularly favourable for trade. 
 
In order to investigate whether the difference between the rural and urban level of 
commercialisation is mainly due to differences in endowments or treatment, these two effects are 
analysed individually. The most significant differences in the treatment are related to households’ 
distance to the market, and variables related to farming, such as having farming as main activity, 
and owning land, cattle or sheep. Also seasons have different impact on commercialisation 
depending on whether the household is rural or urban. The source of the largest difference in the 
endowments, on the other hand, are the agricultural variables, as was to be expected. Not only are 
the rural areas more agriculturalised but farming has also different impact on commercialisation in 
rural areas compared to the urban areas. The second largest source of inequality comes from 
distance to the market: rural households are located further from the markets and each kilometre is 
also more harmful in terms of commercialisation than in the urban areas.  
 
7 Conclusions 
Commercialisation was found to be a significant determinant of household consumption in this 
study. Both the consumption side of commercialisation as well as engaging in trade as a seller are 
likely to lead to sizable increase in household’s consumption. One percentage point increase in 
commercialisation leads to, on average and ceteris paribus, 0.3-0.5 percentage increase in the 
consumption in the pooled sample, 0.5-0.7 percentage increase in rural areas, and 0.1-0.4 
percentage increase in urban areas, respectively. On the other hand, a household that engages in 
selling agricultural output consumes, on average and ceteris paribus, 11-13 percent more than a 
household that does not engage in trade in all samples. There is thus a clear case in favour of 
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enhancing further commercialisation in Tanzania. Besides commercialisation, also education and 
income sources had a particularly large impact on consumption, implying that commercialisation 
efforts should be a part of a larger development agenda where diversification of livelihoods, reliable 
market structures and social security networks are supported. 
 
However, the means for achieving greater integration to the local markets and thus higher levels of 
commercialisation are not straightforward. Access to markets and market information were found to 
be significant determinants of commercialisation, and even shorter distances to the nearest market 
were found to isolate households and push them towards autarky. This finding encourages further 
investment in infrastructure. Other empirical evidence also backs up this recommendation: a recent 
evaluation of an infrastructure development programme in Tanzania shows large benefits from 
investing in rural roads that have previously been mostly impassable (Gajewski et al. 2002). Also 
household characteristics, such as education and inclination towards agricultural activities, were 
found to be important determinants of commercialisation, and thus further emphasis on primary and 
secondary education as well as improved opportunities for diversified livelihoods are ways to boost 
commercialisation and consumption. On the other hand, the size and significance of regional and 
seasonal fixed effects highlight the importance of structural barriers related to trade, that cannot be 
captured by household characteristics. Farmers’ representatives and policy makers interviewed for 
this study confirm the notion of large costs for trade due to rigidities at the markets. For example, 
even though most of the farmers are able to access the closest trading point, the traders might not be 
there; farmers have poor knowledge on business practices; price fluctuation makes trade very 
unreliable; market information is poorly disseminated; credit is on short supply due to lack of 
collateral and unsure future profits from selling the harvest; traditional norms and government 
policy encourage food self-sufficiency; and poor processing and storage facilities are all examples 
of the structural constraints for further commercialisation facing Tanzanian households today. Thus, 
broad based development efforts are needed at all levels of the marketing chain to solve the issue of 
currently prevailing bottlenecks in trade in Tanzania.  
 
At local village level the benefits from improved access to markets are conditional on appropriate 
policies being in place allowing and encouraging trade to develop. As the results of this study 
highlight there is substantial scope for improvement in the current trading environment to allow 
large scale commercialisation that would boost consumption levels throughout the country. As 
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Fafchamps et al. (2003) point out, trade is dependent on frictions in the whole marketing chain. 
Government officials can play an important role in ensuring that efficient marketing structures are 
in place and that legislation and actual praxis enables further reliance on the markets. Current 
efforts of the Tanzanian government to liberalise domestic trade, remove state monopolies and 
liberalise transportation markets are good examples of political measures to enhance possibilities to 
trade. 
 
Due to the clear and large positive income effect of commercialisation found in this study, 
commercialisation efforts can be advocated as income enhancing in Tanzania. One possible and 
statistically significant tool to enhance commercialisation would be to improve the access to the 
markets and market information, but as discussed above, mere investment in infrastructure is not 
likely to lead to large changes in behaviour as there are still large structural constraints for 
households’ commercialisation in place. The lack of transportation and poorly developed markets 
have made speculation possible even when the cost of transportation per se would be low. The fact 
remains that large regional fixed effects capture a lot of the variation in the model that cannot be 
otherwise captured by the household level variables. This emphasises the need for further research 
in order to understand the regional effects and structural barriers present in Tanzania restricting the 
households’ commercialisation. Such research could also provide examples of especially favourable 
conditions for trading and models for best practice in enhancing commercialisation in order to 
improve the policies aimed at enhancing commercialisation and fight poverty. 
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Appendix: COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR HOUSEHOLD TOTAL CONSUMPTION PER ADULT 
EQUIVALENT FOR 28 DAYS (RURAL MODEL) 
 
  Reduced OLS Reduced IV Full OLS Full IV 
Commercialisation 0.562*** - 0.488*** - 
  (11.12) - (9.33) - 
Predicted values - 0.658*** - 0.499** 
  - (3.37) - (2.37) 
HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHICS 
HH has only 1 member † † † † 
  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HH has 2-6 family members -0.507*** -0.507*** -0.515*** -0.515*** 
  (15.59) (15.10) (15.87) (15.46) 
HH has 7 or more members -0.866*** -0.868*** -0.885*** -0.888*** 
  (23.38) (22.81) (24.01) (23.25) 
HH head is male -0.008 -0.006 -0.011 -0.011 
  (0.39) (0.31) (0.59) (0.56) 
HH head age  0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.11) (0.27) (0.01) (0.38) 
HH head sick o in last 4 weeks 0.007 0.005 0.010 0.009 
  (0.41) (0.28) (0.59) (0.50) 
HH head has no education † † † † 
  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HH head has primary education 0.035 0.028 0.038* 0.033 
  (1.58) (1.27) (1.75) (1.52) 
HH head has secondary educ. 0.036 0.033 0.042 0.041 
  (1.03) (0.94) (1.20) (1.17) 
HH head has higher education 0.094** 0.091** 0.102*** 0.099** 
  (2.38) (2.29) (2.59) (2.52) 
MAIN ACTIVITY IS FARMING 
The main activity of the HH  -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 -0.007 
head is farming/livestock (0.37) (0.23) (0.43) (0.35) 
PRODUCTIVE ASSETS 
log of assets  -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 
  (0.56) (0.34) (0.70) (0.46) 
HH has no land  † † † † 
  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HH owns max 2 acres of land -0.015 -0.004 -0.010 -0.005 
  (0.48) (0.11) (0.31) (0.16) 
HH owns 2-10 acres of land 0.036 0.050 0.045 0.051 
  (1.07) (1.31) (1.29) (1.42) 
HH owns more than 10 acres 0.167*** 0.174*** 0.179*** 0.181*** 
  (3.99) (4.01) (4.21) (4.29) 
HH has 1-10 cows 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 
  (3.37) (3.38) (3.77) (3.69) 
HH has more than 10 cows 0.137*** 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.159*** 
  (3.60) (3.84) (3.98) (4.21) 
HH has 1-10 sheep 0.010 0.005 0.001 -0.004 
  (0.48) (0.25) (0.05) (0.17) 
HH has more than 10 sheep 0.023 0.023 0.013 0.014 
  (0.71) (0.72) (0.42) (0.44) 
HH has access to electricity 0.308*** 0.295*** 0.284*** 0.281*** 
  (6.99) (5.82) (6.64) (6.00) 
INCOME SOURCES 
HH sells agricultural output - - 0.113*** 0.112*** 
  - - (5.27) (5.26) 
HH sells non-farm output - - 0.083*** 0.078*** 
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  - - (4.05) (3.25) 
MAIN SOURCES OF CASH 
HH’s main source of cash is  † † † † 
agriculture  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HH's main source of cash is - - 0.162*** 0.167*** 
wage or business income - - (6.52) (4.74) 
HH's main source of cash is - - -0.024 -0.017 
remittances or other undefined - - (0.73) (0.53) 
SEASONAL VARIATION 
January  † † † † 
  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
February  0.025 0.023 0.017 0.014 
  (0.49) (0.47) (0.34) (0.29) 
March  0.063 0.073 0.051 0.059 
  (1.25) (1.45) (1.01) (1.20) 
April  0.077 0.075 0.062 0.060 
  (1.55) (1.48) (1.26) (1.20) 
May  -0.035 -0.044 -0.044 -0.048 
  (0.63) (0.77) (0.81) (0.86) 
June  -0.041 -0.039 -0.050 -0.045 
  (0.79) (0.72) (0.99) (0.86) 
July  0.045 0.038 0.032 0.030 
  (0.89) (0.69) (0.65) (0.57) 
August  0.041 0.035 0.027 0.024 
  (0.83) (0.67) (0.54) (0.46) 
September  0.026 0.020 0.011 0.011 
  (0.52) (0.39) (0.23) (0.21) 
October  -0.022 -0.033 -0.034 -0.039 
  (0.43) (0.61) (0.69) (0.75) 
November  0.046 0.044 0.034 0.036 
  (0.92) (0.86) (0.71) (0.72) 
December  0.065 0.054 0.065 0.062 
  (1.23) (1.02) (1.28) (1.19) 
REGIONAL VARIATION 
Dodoma  † † † † 
  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Arusha  -0.213*** -0.234*** -0.178** -0.189** 
  (2.83) (2.82) (2.31) (2.20) 
Kilimanjaro  -0.161*** -0.175** -0.112* -0.109 
  (2.81) (2.50) (1.89) (1.42) 
Tanga  -0.068 -0.075 -0.037 -0.034 
  (1.26) (1.25) (0.65) (0.54) 
Morogoro  0.061 0.059 0.109 0.110 
  (0.86) (0.80) (1.55) (1.50) 
Pwani  -0.059 -0.076 -0.033 -0.033 
  (0.75) (0.85) (0.43) (0.36) 
Dar es Salaam  -0.096 -0.118 -0.086 -0.085 
  (0.77) (0.88) (0.68) (0.63) 
Lindi  -0.007 -0.011 0.026 0.029 
  (0.07) (0.11) (0.26) (0.28) 
Mtwara  -0.010 -0.008 0.035 0.042 
  (0.09) (0.07) (0.32) (0.38) 
Ruvuma  -0.104 -0.086 -0.067 -0.049 
  (1.47) (1.23) (0.95) (0.70) 
Iringa  0.033 0.013 0.062 0.045 
  (0.39) (0.16) (0.73) (0.53) 
Mbeya  0.120 0.115 0.150** 0.149** 
 52
  (1.64) (1.60) (2.00) (1.99) 
Singida  -0.259*** -0.236*** -0.223*** -0.201*** 
  (3.91) (3.82) (3.21) (3.11) 
Tabora  0.008 0.001 0.033 0.032 
  (0.14) (0.01) (0.59) (0.53) 
Rukwa  -0.225*** -0.231*** -0.183** -0.184** 
  (2.93) (2.96) (2.40) (2.36) 
Kigoma  -0.173** -0.178** -0.144** -0.141* 
  (2.44) (2.39) (2.05) (1.84) 
Shinyanga  0.134* 0.139* 0.171** 0.175** 
  (1.68) (1.74) (2.13) (2.16) 
Kagera  0.193*** 0.194*** 0.211*** 0.215*** 
  (2.80) (2.80) (3.06) (3.08) 
Mwanza  -0.179** -0.220*** -0.121 -0.143 
  (2.31) (2.58) (1.56) (1.61) 
Mara  -0.398*** -0.419*** -0.358*** -0.358*** 
  (3.84) (3.54) (3.54) (3.03) 
Constant  9.442*** 9.379*** 9.362*** 9.347*** 
  (89.47) (62.88) (90.66) (66.23) 
 
Observations  7580 7405 7580 7405 
 
R-squared  0.21 0.25 0.22 0.21 
 
RESET test  1.88 4.39*** 2.15* 0.58 
Prob >F  0.130 0.004 0.092 0.625 
 
Hansen-Sargan  - 85.985 - 90.748* 
Prob > Chi-sq  - 0.161 - 0.090 
 
Endogeneity test 0.26 - 0.00 - 
Prob > F  0.608 - 0.946 - 
 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
† denotes base category 
 53
Appendix (continued): COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR HOUSEHOLD TOTAL CONSUMPTION PER 
ADULT EQUIVALENT FOR 28 DAYS (URBAN MODEL) 
 
  Reduced OLS Reduced IV Full OLS Full IV 
Commercialisation 0.418*** 0.200 0.342*** 0.084 
  (8.13) (0.93) (6.63) (0.38) 
HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHICS 
HH has only 1 member † † † † 
  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HH has 2-6 family members -0.533*** -0.528*** -0.553*** -0.548*** 
  (26.95) (25.87) (28.55) (27.68) 
HH has 7 or more members -0.909*** -0.904*** -0.943*** -0.938*** 
  (38.39) (37.32) (40.64) (39.93) 
HH head is male -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 
  (0.47) (0.60) (0.42) (0.55) 
HH head age  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (3.42) (3.47) (3.36) (3.39) 
HH head sick in last 4 weeks 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
  (2.97) (2.83) (3.06) (2.91) 
HH head has no education † † † † 
  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HH head has primary education 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.011 
  (0.38) (0.50) (0.50) (0.64) 
HH head has secondary educ. 0.017 0.022 0.019 0.023 
  (0.74) (0.89) (0.80) (0.98) 
HH head has higher education 0.040 0.041 0.045* 0.045* 
  (1.51) (1.54) (1.71) (1.73) 
MAIN ACTIVITY IS FARMING 
The main activity of the HH  0.025 0.020 0.029* 0.024 
head is farming/livestock (1.63) (1.26) (1.90) (1.57)   
PRODUCTIVE ASSETS 
log of assets  0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 
  (1.16) (1.34) (1.21) (1.42) 
HH has no land  † † † † 
  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HH owns max 2 acres of land -0.057*** -0.070*** -0.039** -0.051** 
  (3.38) (3.18) (2.37) (2.55) 
HH owns 2-10 acres of land -0.027 -0.046* -0.006 -0.021 
  (1.35) (1.66) (0.31) (0.86) 
HH owns more than 10 acres  -0.002 -0.016 0.046 0.038 
  (0.05) (0.41) (1.31) (1.07) 
HH has 1-10 cows 0.099*** 0.096*** 0.082*** 0.081*** 
  (4.35) (4.23) (3.78) (3.75) 
HH has more than 10 cows -0.089 -0.091 -0.080 -0.078 
  (1.53) (1.57) (1.43) (1.40) 
HH has 1-10 sheep 0.061*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.040** 
  (3.39) (2.60) (2.74) (2.00) 
HH has more than 10 sheep 0.109*** 0.102*** 0.093*** 0.086*** 
  (3.55) (3.22) (3.03) (2.72) 
HH has access to electricity 0.304*** 0.313*** 0.290*** 0.297*** 
  (17.30) (16.23) (16.99) (16.54) 
INCOME SOURCES 
HH sells agricultural output - - 0.121*** 0.108*** 
  - - (7.07) (5.18) 
HH sells non-farm output - - 0.137*** 0.141*** 
  - - (10.32) (10.15) 
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MAIN SOURCES OF INCOME 
HH’s main source of cash is  † † † † 
agriculture  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HH's main source of cash is - - 0.164*** 0.181*** 
wage or business income - - (8.81) (7.83) 
HH's main source of cash is - - -0.021 -0.019 
remittances or other undefined - - (0.94) (0.84) 
SEASONAL VARIATION 
January  † † † † 
  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
February  0.025 0.022 0.029 0.026 
  (1.19) (1.07) (1.40) (1.26) 
March  -0.000 -0.003 0.004 0.000 
  (0.01) (0.13) (0.17) (0.02) 
April  -0.015 -0.019 -0.013 -0.018 
  (0.64) (0.83) (0.59) (0.78) 
May  -0.005 -0.008 -0.003 -0.008 
  (0.18) (0.32) (0.13) (0.29) 
June  -0.026 -0.029 -0.028 -0.031 
  (1.00) (1.15) (1.09) (1.22) 
July  0.029 0.024 0.022 0.017 
  (1.21) (0.98) (0.91) (0.71) 
August  0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.011 
  (0.08) (0.11) (0.24) (0.45) 
September  0.041* 0.039 0.040* 0.037 
  (1.68) (1.60) (1.65) (1.55) 
October  -0.012 -0.012 -0.022 -0.022 
  (0.55) (0.55) (1.00) (1.01) 
November  0.028 0.027 0.024 0.023 
  (1.27) (1.24) (1.10) (1.07) 
December  0.126*** 0.127*** 0.131*** 0.133*** 
  (5.56) (5.59) (5.82) (5.85) 
REGIONAL VARIATION 
Dodoma  † † † † 
  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Arusha  -0.123** -0.114** -0.094* -0.083 
  (2.44) (2.19) (1.86) (1.59) 
Kilimanjaro  -0.049 -0.038 -0.012 0.005 
  (0.90) (0.68) (0.22) (0.09) 
Tanga  0.025 0.038 0.071 0.088 
  (0.45) (0.68) (1.33) (1.58) 
Morogoro  0.108* 0.116** 0.139** 0.149*** 
  (1.94) (2.05) (2.57) (2.71) 
Pwani  -0.009 0.009 0.010 0.030 
  (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.53) 
Dar es Salaam  0.093* 0.104** 0.131** 0.142*** 
  (1.82) (1.97) (2.58) (2.73) 
Lindi  0.062 0.070 0.085 0.095 
  (0.89) (0.97) (1.23) (1.32) 
Mtwara  -0.021 -0.016 -0.018 -0.013 
  (0.31) (0.25) (0.27) (0.20) 
Ruvuma  0.021 0.020 0.020 0.019 
  (0.34) (0.32) (0.33) (0.30) 
Iringa  0.244*** 0.243*** 0.254*** 0.252*** 
  (3.82) (3.87) (4.22) (4.25) 
Mbeya  0.119** 0.120** 0.176*** 0.179*** 
  (2.48) (2.49) (3.59) (3.62) 
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Singida  -0.027 -0.021 -0.032 -0.027 
  (0.52) (0.39) (0.60) (0.50) 
Tabora  0.251*** 0.270*** 0.291*** 0.314*** 
  (3.75) (3.91) (4.64) (4.77) 
Rukwa  -0.031 -0.030 -0.007 -0.003 
  (0.55) (0.51) (0.13) (0.06) 
Kigoma  0.252*** 0.257*** 0.253*** 0.260*** 
  (4.39) (4.43) (4.43) (4.49) 
Shinyanga  0.267*** 0.272*** 0.278*** 0.281*** 
  (5.40) (5.37) (5.83) (5.77) 
Kagera  0.256*** 0.254*** 0.267*** 0.265*** 
  (4.87) (4.82) (5.01) (4.96) 
Mwanza  -0.008 0.010 0.040 0.062 
  (0.13) (0.15) (0.66) (0.97) 
Mara  -0.225*** -0.199** -0.145** -0.114 
  (3.11) (2.54) (2.07) (1.48) 
Constant  9.473*** 9.653*** 9.351*** 9.551*** 
  (112.70) (52.10) (111.53) (52.25)  
 
Observations  14143 14125 14143 14125 
 
R-squared  0.23 0.09 0.25 0.08 
 
RESET test  2.13* 0.68 0.79 0.51 
Prob > F  0.094 0.5671 0.500 0.674 
 
Hansen-Sargan  - 62.598 - 59.048 
Prob > chi-sq  - 0.254 - 0.365 
 
Endogeneity test 1.09 - 1.43 - 
Prob > F  0.296 - 0.232 - 
  
Robust t statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
† denotes base category 
 
 
 
